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The Pedigree of Accounting in Kiribati and its Consequent Prospects in the 
Transparency and Accountability Stakes, Sponsored by the International 
Financial Institutions 
Abstract 
Purpose – In espousing transparency and accountability of public authorities in the Global 
South, international financial institutions (e.g. International Monetary Fund, World Bank) 
have great expectations of how accounting will perform. In this paper, I assess the prospects 
of such expectations in the Republic of Kiribati. 
Design/methodology/approach – I compile a genealogy of accounting from a review of 
historical sources and participant-observation data and elaborate the bloodlines it comprises 
by taking a genealogical perspective of power and knowledge. 
Findings – Accounting practices in Kiribati turn out to be more mongrel-like than thoroughly 
bred from classic bloodlines, deriving from a hackneyed pool one can trace to I-Matang (i.e. 
white people indigenous to Europe) whose various activities have done much to shape said 
economy over the past two centuries. Although not considered as such by I-Matang, and so 
by I-Kiribati (i.e. people of Kiribati), an accounting remains that was part of the way that I-
Kiribati lived before I-Matang began arriving. The practices called accounting are regarded 
by most I-Kiribati as part of institutions that still “belong” to I-Matang, notwithstanding that 
they inherited them as an adjunct to attaining independence from the former colonial power 
(i.e. Britain). While I-Kiribati interact with these institutions regularly, many seem not 
understand them and even more have few historic reasons to know that the institutions have a 
duty of accountability to them, through accounting or similar.  
Research limitations/implications – I have tried to overcome uneven coverage, 
geographically, temporally and otherwise, of field research and secondary sources. 
Alternative light is shed on premises underlying key planks of structural adjustment policies.  
Originality/value – The study could fuel discussion of how international financial 
institutions seem to think transparency and accountability are fostered, and whether the latter 
is rhetoric masking neo-colonial activities, intended or otherwise. 
Keywords Genealogy of accounting, Pacific Islands, power and knowledge 
Paper type Research paper
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Transparency and accountability are critical for the efficient functioning of a modern 
economy and for fostering social well being. In most societies, many powers are 
delegated to public authorities. Some assurance must then be provided to the 
delegators—that is, society at large—that this transfer of power is not only effective, 
but also not abused. Transparency ensures that information is available that can be 
used to measure the authorities' performance and to guard against any possible misuse 
of powers. In that sense, transparency serves to achieve accountability, which means 
that authorities can be held responsible for their actions. Without transparency and 
accountability, trust will be lacking between a government and those whom it 
governs. The result would be social instability and an environment that is less than 
conducive to economic growth. (Carstens, 2005, p. 1) 
Introduction 
Accounting is often associated with three interrelated processes. It facilitates and legitimises 
the process of persons within organisations clarifying their decision options economically. It 
is a means for reporting about the organisations in question in order that, among other things, 
economic outcomes of the behaviours of said persons within organisations are more 
transparent than otherwise, thus allowing these outcomes to be evaluated by anyone so 
inclined within and without the organisations in question. It facilitates accountability between 
persons to whom resources are entrusted and whose behaviours influence organisational 
performance and condition, and various publics with interests in said resources, performance, 
condition and associated matters. For example, in a republic, citizens confer agency 
responsibility on politicians, public officials, and institutional and other professionals. As 
citizens individually and collectively increase the duty on their agents to account publicly and 
so make their activities transparent, so the parity increases between the knowledge and power 
these various agents can exercise and the knowledge and power exercisable by the citizens. 
Thus, when exercising discretion in making decisions, performing actions and applying 
effort, agents are under greater influence of citizens and what they do in the name of the 
republic is more in accord with citizens’ wishes. 
While the quotation from Carstens (2005) above apparently incorporates these aspects of 
agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), it seems to further suggest that transparency and 
accountability, and therefore accounting, pervade many more aspects of modern life than may 
be popularly perceived; and that accounting practices are socially, politically and culturally 
significant, as well as economically so. Such ideas are borne out by more than two decades of 
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studies of accounting as part of how organisations and societies function (Hopwood and 
Miller, 1994; Macintosh and Hopper, 2005). However, like most accounting research, as a 
rule these studies are situated in the Global North, a score of exceptions (e.g. Briston, 1978, 
Irvine and Deo, 2006; Kearins and Hooper, 2002; Neu and Graham, 2006; Nzdinge and 
Briston, 1999; Pok, 1995) proving the rule. When making his argument, Carstens was deputy 
managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which along with other 
international financial institutions (e.g. its partner in Washington, the World Bank, and the 
Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB)) has been championing structural adjustment 
programmes in the Global South for three decades, such as I describe analytically elsewhere 
regarding the Republic of Kiribati (Dixon, 2004a). As Carstens exemplifies, these 
programmes continue to be espoused as necessary to increasing economic growth in the 
Global South, albeit with grassroots ideas on social stability, participation, poverty reduction 
and environmental sustainability being added recently to the rhetoric (e.g. ADB, 2001, 2002, 
2006, 2007; Castalia Advisory Services, 2005; IMF, 2001), although their situated practices 
often attract accusations of neo-colonialism because of how knowledge and power associated 
with them is exercised (Annisette, 2000, 2004; Willis, 2005). New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms have been increasingly incorporated into these programmes (Larbi, 1999) and 
Carstens’s argument epitomises the prominence accorded in NPM to an accounting 
technology (in the broad sense of theories, methods and practices of the discipline) that is 
reflective of new organisational and social practices, and constitutive of these new practices 
(e.g. see Hood, 1995; Lapsley, 1999, 2005).  
In discussing unexpected and unintended effects of NPM, among the cultural surprises that 
Hood and Peters (2004) consider is the triumph of hope over experience. This is manifested 
in ideas being implemented repeatedly and giving rise repeatedly to disappointing outcomes, 
including in the Global South, for reasons of institutional capture and unswerving belief in 
particular technology. It can be construed as not learning from the past, at least in part from 
not knowing it, or not wanting to know it. This is my point of departure in this paper. I have 
delved into accounting practiced in the vicinity of Kiribati as far back as sources and some 
reasonable conjecture allow in order to compile a genealogy of accounting. The genealogy 
covers a few centuries and illuminates who has used accounting and in what ways. It is 
concerned with micro-practices and the exercise of power in local transactions and processes, 
some among I-Kiribati (i.e. persons of Kiribati) but most between I-Kiribati and I-Matang 
(i.e. white people indigenous to Europe[1]), or other foreigners, in which accounting figures, 
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often behind the scenes, seemingly ordinarily and mundanely, which are good reasons for 
social researchers to take notice of phenomena (see Pollner cited in Robillard, 1992).  
Here I present the genealogy, elaborate its bloodlines and then discuss implications in the 
light of Carstens’s argument, the triumph of hope over experience and accusations of neo-
colonialism. In relation to Carstens’s argument, I have used the genealogy to assess the extent 
that experience might have equipped I-Kiribati citizens of the republic with knowledge and 
power to apply accounting in ways consistent with his transparency and accountability 
espousals of the international financial institutions, which is reflected as far as Kiribati is 
concerned in ADB (2002). In relation to the triumph of hope over experience, I have used it 
to identify ideas being implemented repeatedly and giving rise repeatedly to outcomes that 
have been disappointing for I-Kiribati. In relation to neo-colonialism, I have used it to 
identify how I-Kiribati have not been as politically and economically independent as might 
have been supposed at various times but particularly following the dissolution of the Gilbert 
and Ellice Islands Colony (GEIC) after 64 years (1916-79)[2], the departure of the governor 
and other officials appointed by the British Government after nearly 90 years (they 
established the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate (GEIP) (1892-1915) before the GEIC), 
the institution of the republic in 1979 (GEIC, 1974; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982; Maude, 
1968), and the cessation of mining after 80 years (1900-80), the last 60 under the auspices of 
the British Phosphate Commissioners (BPC) (King and Sigrah, 2004; Macdonald, 1982; 
Williams and Macdonald, 1985). Kiribati, by the way, is pronounced key-ree-bas, being the 
way I-Kiribati enunciate Gilberts. 
In delving into accounting, I took a wide view of what it comprises, allowing that it includes 
the practices, and underlying theories and methods, associated with financial and 
management accounting, auditing, private and public organisational finance and other 
branches of the discipline in the Global North. I considered the review by Gallhofer, Gibson, 
Haslam, McNicholas and Takiari (2000) of work on developing accounting systems reflective 
of indigenous culture, and discussion of the accounting of Australian Aboriginals by Gibson 
(2000) and Greer and Patel (2000). I took the positions that the knowledge, skills and values 
that accounting encompasses are forever-changing (e.g. on the incorporation of economic 
discourse, see Hopwood, 1992). The practices derive meanings from interactions among 
many categories of people in organisations and societies, accountants and managers included 
but not only these by any means. Wallace and Briston (1993) elaborate a similarly wide 
definition of “accounting infrastructure” in relation to developing countries. Similarly wide is 
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Neu’s use of the term accounting to refer to “numerical, monetarized calculations techniques 
which mediate the relations between individuals, groups, and institutions as well as the 
accountability relationships that result from these social relations” (2000, p. 270). Particular 
points Neu makes and that I utilise are that accounting plays distributive and ideological 
roles, it includes incentive schemes and financing relations, and it enables the conveying of 
knowledge over distance (e.g. about people situated on the 180° meridian to people living on 
the Greenwich (0°) meridian). The relevance of this last example is that Kiribati is at the 
juncture of the 180° meridian and Equator, while the British Government’s Colonial Office, 
etc. is in London (0° longitude).  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, I outline where the study is located 
theoretically and how it was conducted. Next, I provide retrospective analytical (i.e. theory-
laden) descriptions of the several accounting bloodlines in the evolving political economy 
and social environment of I-Kiribati, starting from when islands and parts of islands had been 
separate polities with forms of government that I-Kiribati had developed of their own accord, 
and including not only the colonial and post-colonial periods just alluded to but also the early 
part of the 19th century, when there was a creeping informal colonialism across the central 
and south Pacific, through commercial interests, missionaries and imperial naval activity 
(Davie, 2000; GEIC, 1974; Macdonald, 1971, 1982; Maude, 1968). Next, I discuss the 
matters outlined above. Finally, I provide conclusions and suggest avenues for further 
research.  
Study Location 
I have indicated already where the study is located geographically. Turning to its theoretical 
location, to give an account of how accounting figures in the way organisations and societies 
function, a range of often grand organisational and sociological theories are available, along 
with corresponding interpretive sociological methods (Chua, 1988; Covaleski, Dirsmith and 
Samuel, 1996; Denzin, 1989). Notwithstanding, I decided to follow leads taken by Alam, 
Lawrence and Nandan (2004), who argue that in studies of the relatively uncharted 
accounting of the Global South, historically specific stories and localised theories can better 
illuminate the various relations referred to in the foregoing than reaching for grander social 
theory; and by Irvine and Deo (2006), who show that relationships between societal theory 
and empirical data of this ilk are somewhat tenuous, and anyway derive from the values of 
the researchers (see also Davis, Menon and Morgan, 1982; Silverman and Gubrium, 1989; 
Turner, 1989). Thus, in theoretical terms, among the analytical description and discussions, at 
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best my paper contains only localised theories, employing metaphor, differentiation and 
concepts theories (Llewellyn, 2003). However, as can be implied from the title[3] and the 
earlier stated intention of compiling a genealogy of accounting practices, I have followed 
other accounting researchers (e.g. Hoskin and Macve, 1994; Kearins and Hooper, 2002; 
Miller and O’Leary, 1987; Neu and Graham, 2006) in using a micro-level genealogical 
method and analysis, which they induced from the work of Michel Foucault and exemplified. 
The approach is appropriate because I was active in the field of inquiry at a micro level and 
could review written material by people similarly placed (e.g. Grimble, 1921, 1952, 1957; 
Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982; Maude, 1963, 1968, 1977a, 1977b; Sabatier, 1977)[4]. 
Moreover, the field in which I worked is small, isolated, and comprises people with much 
cultural homogeneity: in the eyes of the outside world, they form an independent republic, 
often classified as a microstate.  
As to personal stance, while acting as an intercultural mediator, I try to consider matters from 
the I-Kiribati side, thus taking a partisan stance that is familiar in qualitative sociological 
studies (Silverman, 1985) but which is not without difficulties (Gallhofer and Chew, 2000). I 
try to marry the interactionists’ concern for the meanings that accounting has for I-Kiribati 
and the radical humanist aim of illumination giving rise to emancipation between I-Kiribati 
and I-Matang (re interactionism and humanism, see Macintosh, 1994).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
The total population of Kiribati is now nearing 100,000, having increased threefold in less 
than a century. Although studying power relations and processes in such a slightly populated 
place is probably easier than in more populous societies, one still finds a rich mixture of the 
regulated and non-regulated, and legitimate and informal, from which to shed light 
elsewhere, and so give the study wide appeal. A familiar theme of the accounting literature 
on the Global South is the heterogeneity of the peoples, habitats and economic prosperity it 
encompasses (e.g. Wallace, 1990, 1999), inferring that all-encompassing theories are 
incongruous and that studies of individual peoples and countries are vital to know the 
diversity and complexity entailed (Wallace and Briston, 1993). Indeed, Macdonald (1982) 
signals dangers and inadequacies of generalisation even studying among the peoples of the 21 
populated islands of Kiribati, and the contrasts with Tuvalu, because of differences among 
these peoples, which in turn has given rise to different ways that they have responded to 
similar influences, and because of field research and written sources about them being uneven 
in coverage, geographically, temporally and otherwise. Thus, I attach the term illumination to 
my results advisedly (see Denzin, 1989; Patton, 1990), and stress that how brightly my study 
illuminates other peoples and places depends on contingencies such as the natural 
environment, social and material culture, and sources and applications of accounting 
technologies.  
Elsewhere (Dixon, 2004a, 2004b), I have documented my extempore involvement with I-
Kiribati and participant-observation on Kiribati. In essence, it goes back over 20 years begun 
by and incidental to marriage to an expatriate I-Kiribati. I first visited South Tarawa, now the 
seat of government, on Tarawa Atoll and Nikunau Island in 1985, and my most recent stay 
ended in 1999. During visits, I lived among my utu ni kaan (i.e. closer extended family[5]), 
experiencing their style of living, and so, unwittingly, I was following Grimble and Clarke’s 
advice about not expecting “to know the native until you have learned his home life. . . . by 
constant hut-to-hut visitation” (1929, introduction, no p. no.). For two periods (1988-89 and 
1997-99), I staged accounting courses (see Dixon, 2004b), gathering data to design some of 
these. Subsequently, I have delved into the evolving political economy and social 
environment of I-Kiribati and followed current events there from Britain and New Zealand, 
by consulting academic, governmental, international organisation and other sources (e.g. 
news services, memoirs of colonial officials and missionaries, public records and archives), 
and by listening to many, many anecdotes about the GEIC and Kiribati, some told by 
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expatriate I-Kiribati but mostly by I-Matang whose experiences there spanned the 1960s 
through to the 2000s.  
I was at some disadvantage because I lack te taetae ni Kiribati (also known as Gilbertese), 
the language common to all I-Kiribati)[6]. This certainly applied during 13 weeks I was on 
Nikunau but also for most of the time on Tarawa. Te taetae ni Kiribati is the only oral 
language of most I-Kiribati and increasingly they have come to write in it, if they write at all. 
While a significant minority of I-Kiribati have fair knowledge and skills of written English, 
most lack practice in it and rarely use it orally and only when necessary. This is 
notwithstanding that English is much used in secondary school education, particularly in 
textbooks[7] and was for official purposes under British rule (1892-1979).  
I allude above to the comparative value of the study being lessened by differences between 
Kiribati and other peoples and their habitats within the Global South categorisation. Further 
contingencies about the study’s value stem from shortcomings in my methods, besides those 
normally associated with the human-as-instrument (see Guba and Lincoln, 1983; Patton, 1990; 
Sanday, 1979). A positive is that my extended experience makes me not as prone as many I-
Matang are after single and often brief, less intimate encounters to such Eurocentric 
behaviour as proposing first-world “solutions” to innate situations that I-Matang often 
perceive as “local problems” (for discussions on this issue, see Devlin and Godfrey, 1998; 
Gallhofer and Chew, 2000; Llewellyn, 2003; Robillard, 1992). However, I am not 
acculturated or transculturalised, and believe that I cannot become so[8]. As I am an 
accountant writing for an accounting audience, I may be prone to providing “overly 
accounting-centric explanations” (Neu, 2000, p. 283). However, I have tried to avoid this, 
although accounting is bound to feature prominently anyway, given an intention to reveal 
specifically its place in the evolution of the exercise of power.  
Analytical Description 
Using the methods outlined above, I was able to discern many instances of accounting. I have 
used my biased, expert judgement to arrange these into various bloodlines to make up the 
genealogy of present day accounting I was intent on compiling. For the sake of order and the 
limits of space available in a publishable paper, I have reduced these to the 10 bloodlines 
shown in Figure 1 and condensed the analytical descriptions of each to a few pages, as 
presented in subsections below. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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I-Kiribati Society and Accounting Appendages 
To compile this section I have reviewed work by several authors (e.g. Alaima Talu et al., 
1979; Crocombe, 1987; Grimble, 1921; King and Sigrah, 2004; Lambert, 1966, 1987; 
Lundsgaarde, 1974; Macdonald 1971, 1982; Maude, 1963; Pole, 1995; Sabatier, 1977) who 
have constructed descriptions of I-Kiribati society before recorded interaction with I-Matang 
(see Maude, 1968; Officer on Board the Said Ship, 1767), or drawn up learned descriptions of 
the material culture of I-Kiribati on some so-called Outer Islands (Geddes, Chambers, 
Sewell, Lawrence and Watters, 1982; Koch, 1986). The latter give an inkling of life must 
have been like, notwithstanding that they were completed well after encounters with I-
Matang had been reflected in and reconstituted these societies.  
Significantly, political units in the Gilberts and Banaba comprised parts of islands, islands or 
groups of adjacent islands. Between c. 1400 and c. 1850, they took two forms: the southerly 
islands and often many northerly ones were gerontocracies headed by a council of unimane, 
(i.e. wise and respected old men); and Butaritari and occasionally other northerly islands 
were monarchies, under uea (i.e. chiefs)[9]. I shall focus primarily on the gerontocracies, two 
important institutions of which were mwaneaba and boti. The first is often translated as 
meetinghouse but better informed is “tabernacle of ancestors” (Maude, 1963, p. 11)[10], 
associated with which were I-Kiribati living in the vicinity in mwenga (i.e. dwelling areas), 
built in clusters to form kainga (i.e. hamlets). While each mwaneaba district was an 
independent polity, their structures and processes were similar, deriving from the cultural 
affinity of neighbouring districts and islands, and their close social ties. Mwaneaba were a 
“masterpiece of Gilbertese culture” (Sabatier, 1977, p. 99) that served as social and religious 
centres, inns for visitors, and political bodies (i.e. I-Kiribati Governments), making no 
distinction among what I-Matang class as legislative, executive and judicial functions under 
te katei, the code of customary social and governmental relationships. Boti (known as inaki 
on some islands) is often translated as clans but were actually the portions of the mwaneaba 
in which people sat according to their ancestry. Each boti was named after a significant te 
bakatibu. The people entitled to sit in particular te boti could be classed as belonging to a 
particular te baronga, which is closer to the idea of a clan (Hegnes Dixon, personal 
communication), and lived together in te kainga belonging to te boti. In a mwaneaba district, 
boti were represented in te mwaneaba by atun (i.e. head) te boti, who were usually the oldest 
non-senile males in each kainga. They were of approximately equal standing and arrived at 
decisions by consensus.  
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I-Kiribati and their culture evolved in harmony with their environment in its totality. Other 
important elements of society were aba (i.e. plots of land). Naturally, they were places on 
which kainga were built, and food and materials grew or were cultivated (e.g. coconut palms, 
pandanus, babai). Moreover, their ownership, use and conveyance were of political, social 
and spiritual significance, touching on many aspects of life (e.g. kinship, marriage, adoption, 
status seniority, group affiliation - Lundsgaarde, 1974)[11]. Aba outside kainga were owned 
individually by males and females, ownership implying enjoyment of aba in life, and 
conveying it during life or on death, usually to a blood or adopted relative[12], provided that 
utu of the owner had residual tenure rights, and so a say in their distribution. Of material 
importance also were rights held variously to the reef, lagoon (if their island had one) and 
ocean. Another set of valuable items were knowledge, skills, rituals and magic spells[13] and 
rituals associated with daily activities, including of such specialists as architect, thatcher, 
outrigger builder, composer, choreographer, warrior, doctor and undertaker. All were long-
established and passed in a jealously guarded way within utu from generation to generation, 
for reasons of place in the community and honour. As to chattels, observations of their 
behaviour during the 24 hours or so that the Dolphin and Tamar were anchored off Nikunau 
led Officer on Board the Said Ship to induce that Kain Nikunau had little idea of private 
property and that “it is probable that they enjoy all things in a manner in common amongst 
themselves” (1767, p. 138).  
From an accounting perspective, aba, rights, and secret knowledge, skills, spells and rituals 
are assets. They were widely distributed among different boti and this reflected, determined 
and reinforced the way power was shared among boti, and within boti among utu, under. All 
this sustained the mwaneaba system, which in turn promoted political stability within an 
island and from island to island, wars (see Sabatier, 1977) being exceptions that proved the 
rule. Their importance to I-Kiribati is signified by oral records or understandings having been 
maintained of which aba belonged to whom such that unimane were reputed not only to 
know the name of every te aba held by members of their utu but also could recall 
descriptions of them, their boundaries and their history of ownership. Notwithstanding, land 
disputes were a feature of life, and continue to be so[14].  
Genealogy is a less obvious subject of accounting as I-Matang know it, but one that was of at 
least equal importance to I-Kiribati as aba, etc. were. Everyone was expected to authenticate 
membership of te boti by reciting their ancestry through several generations, thus allowing a 
comparison with oral records of boti and utu kept by unimane (e.g. Uering, 1979). Recitals 
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were part of the rights of passage to adulthood and, as Grimble (1952) experienced, being 
adopted into boti. In visits to distant mwaneaba, it allowed unknown visitors to prove their 
entitlement to sit with their te boti during formal social, spiritual and political proceedings of 
mwaneaba.  In arranging marriage, it avoided karikira (i.e. incest), which would occur if 
partners shared a great grandparent by blood or adoption[15]. 
Striking are the similarities between the genealogical, spiritual, land and fishing rights 
resources covered in I-Kiribati oral accounts and those in the typology of NZ Maori resources 
developed by Winiata, as reviewed by Gallhofer et al. (2000), and in the accounting of 
Australian Aboriginals (Gibson, 2000; Greer and Patel, 2000). Regarding other, more 
conventional accounting ideas, while social and political obligations were important, 
economic liabilities were incidental to the process of these rather than something tangible and 
worth recording. Bubuti is a long-standing example of this and is of continuing significance 
in the distribution of goods, despite attempts to eliminate it by GEIC officials. Basically, it 
entails a right of a person to solicit goods or services from another and an obligation on the 
owner of the goods or provider of the services to agree, without a direct corresponding 
exchange, although there is an implication of reciprocity in the future (Macdonald, 1982). 
Concepts of trade, commercial manufacture, revenues, costs, and economic profit and loss, or 
surplus and deficit, were unknown.  
The closest to a notion of a tax on income or wealth in the mwaneaba system was probably in 
arranging the frequent ceremonials that were held, over which an agreement about 
contributing was reached among atun te boti and implemented immediately, probably without 
need of a lasting (oral) record. I witnessed these kinds of discussion in the 1980s among 
unimane at Tabomatang; and Kazama (2001) reports similar recent experience at te 
mwaneaba on Tabiteuea South. Furthermore, Lambert (1966) reports that in Butaritari’s 
chiefly system of government, Kain Butaritari (i.e. people of Butaritari) gave food, etc. to 
their uea, usually on occasions to mark critical life passages[16] and to symbolise recognition 
of te uea. How much was given and by whom was determined by consultation beforehand 
and the plan then implemented. Having received this homage, uea duly re-distributed 
surpluses to symbolise their generosity. 
Regarding I-Kiribati accounting comprising only oral records, these had some reliability, 
although whether the absence of written records was because of lack of need, lack of 
technology or to allow unimane to exercise knowledge and power is unclear, save that once 
writing technology was introduced, by I-Matang, it began to be used. For example, Sabatier 
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(1977) refers to people before the 1930s recording their genealogy in exercise books, along 
with knowledge, skills, songs and magic spells, and keeping these records secure, and Uering 
(1979) amounts to such a record.  
Accounting Consequent on Oils 
This section is based on reviews of Macdonald (1971, 1982) and Maude (1968, 1977b) with 
snippets from other authors (e.g. Alaima Talu et al., 1979; Grimble, 1952, 1957; Sabatier, 
1977). Commerce between I-Matang and I-Kiribati was initiated in the 19th century by 
trading ships following the Outer Passage route between Port Jackson and Canton and 
whalers working the On-the-Line[17] grounds during the December to March season. I-
Matang wanted coconuts and other fresh provisions, bêche-de-mere, mats and other 
handicrafts, coconut rum and women. Some whalers (e.g. Ichabod Handy of Massachusetts) 
extended their operations into coconut oil, which was increasingly needed in Europe to 
manufacture soap and candles. I-Kiribati obtained this oil already by pressing coconut meat 
and merely increased its production; and for the whalers, coopering and storing the oil was 
similar to sperm and black oil. Simple barter aboard ship soon gave way to onshore trading 
using plug tobacco as currency. The ships in question voyaged for at least several months and 
sometimes a few years in pursuit of cargos, before eventually returning home; and so voyage 
accounting (see Bigg, Wilson and Langton, 1963) was probably used. This would be as 
prescribed by the proprietors at the home port, and the final accounting records would be 
compiled from each ship’s accounting records. Thus, Maude cites from the papers of Robert 
Towns, a Sydney-based whaling ship owner, the net profits on the voyages of the ships 
Bertha and Black Dog from an “Aggregate statement of profits during the 3 years 1855, 56 & 
57” (1968, p. 266).  
I-Kiribati procured a gradually increasing array of items (e.g. iron, various tools and firearms 
and other weapons made of same, trinkets, poultry and pigs, and tobacco) through this trade, 
and their material culture was modified significantly. However, generally speaking, I-Kiribati 
only had the most befuddled impression of any way of life different from theirs. They had 
little conception of how much I-Matang relied on provisions and of what they were doing 
with coconut oil, and so were unaware of how much more I-Matang would be willing to 
exchange for them. Thus, in these early days I-Kiribati providers might have seen goods to 
the value of barely 5% of the price that their produce realised in Sydney, New Bedford, 
London, etc. Nor would the notion have occurred to anyone involved for I-Kiribati to be paid 
fees for whales taken, in contrast to the present situation of fishing fleets paying the 
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Government of Kiribati AU$10s of millions annually for taking tuna. An exception was on 
Butaritari, where by 1850, an entrepôt trade (e.g. ship provisioning and repairs, stores and 
workshops) was taking off, and Uea Itimaroroa and Kaiea soon realised the potential of this 
in terms of fees, rents and taxes. No doubt these uea kept some form of accounting records 
and distributed some of this income among their subjects in traditional ways, but it does seem 
that for a time their households lived in styles somewhat removed from other I-Kiribati. 
Richard Randell ran a prominent business on Butaritari, in partnership with Charles Smith of 
Smith’s Wharf, Sydney and Captain Hugh Fairclough. They bought coconut oil from I-
Kiribati and sold it in Sydney. They employed itinerant agents, mainly from among 
beachcombers and castaways, and posted them increasingly southwards (e.g. Thomas 
Redfern represented them on Onotoa in 1868 and was still going strong as a trader in 1892), 
eventually eliminating whalers from the coconut oil trade. No records survive (Maude, 1968) 
but Randell probably maintained accounting records on Butaritari, possibly including 
consignment accounts for goods consigned to itinerant agents, with them in turn maintaining 
accounts as consignees (see Bigg, Wilson and Langton, 1963); and Fairclough and other 
ships’ captains they employed probably maintained accounting records on board the ships 
that took the oil and returned with trade goods, etc. It seems likely that all these fed into the 
partnership’s accounts and these were almost certainly maintained by Smith in Sydney.  
About 1870, an alternative way of getting oil to its industrial destinations emerged from J. C. 
Godeffroy and Son in Samoa. It required I-Kiribati only to dry coconut meat, the resulting 
copra being shipped and pressed industrially at the manufacturers in, for example, northwest 
Europe. This technology quickly caught on and made for rationalisation of the trade in the 
whole Pacific such that it became just one of several commodity trades around that region 
that came under the ownership and control of progressively fewer companies, whose main 
books were kept some distance from the Gilberts, albeit that they were mostly represented at 
Butaritari’s entrepôt port. By the 1890s, they included Jaluit Geswellschaft Co. of the 
German Marshalls, Messrs Hernsheim and Co. and J. C. Godeffroy and Son of Apia, German 
Samoa, Crawford & Co. and Wightman Brothers of San Francisco, Henderson and 
Macfarlane of Auckland, and On Chong and Co. and Burns-Philp (South Seas) Ltd of 
Sydney. Fast forward to c.1919 and the Versailles settlement following WWI finalised the 
exit of German interests from the Marshalls and Samoa. Ten years further on, copra prices 
collapsed like other commodity prices did in the Great Depression (Morgan, 1980) and by the 
late 1930s, the Gilberts trade was left to only W. R. Carpenter and Co. and Burns-Philp, the 
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latter with its main wharf at Tarawa having followed Campbell there c. 1896. Copra prices 
rose when WWII started in Europe but trade came to an abrupt halt c. 1941 when the war 
spread to the Pacific Ocean.  
Regressing to the 1870s, I-Kiribati of all islands extended the cultivation of coconut trees to 
take advantage of demand for copra. This meant they could afford more trade goods, whose 
range gradually extended to what I came across on Nikunau in the 1980s (e.g. rice, tea, flour, 
sugar, dried and tinned milk, corned beef, soap, kerosene lamps and fuel, fishing lines, hooks 
and nets, bicycle parts, pots and pans, knives and spoons, tools, other metal goods, and, 
because of the missionaries, cloth, and, despite them, tobacco (but no alcohol)). As copra was 
virtually the only item I-Kiribati could give in exchange for these, so it became the main 
currency, and remained so for at least a century in remoter places[18]. It was used not only 
for trading but also for paying fines, taxes and school fees. Exchange occurred at trading 
stations that were gradually established in most mwaneaba districts[19]. They were operated 
by resident traders and agents, who comprised I-Matang and, later, a few Chinese[20], their I-
Kiribati wives and their offspring. In addition, a few Samoan and Hawaiian Protestant pastors 
generated such a flow of copra from their mission work in the 1880s and 1890s that they 
began trading under the auspices of the mission; and later churches ran stores as a means of 
fundraising and keeping their congregations supplied with goods. An exception to this pattern 
occurred on Abemama (and Kuria and Aranuka), where Uea Baiteke and then Binoka 
controlled a few thousand acres of coconuts and monopolised the entire trade until the 1890s, 
reaping substantial economic, social and political benefits at the expense of their subjects. 
Binoka is reputed to have killed 80% of Kain Kuria and Kain Aranuka and enslaved the rest 
in order to take over their lands and increase the surplus of coconuts (Macdonald, 1982; 
Sabatier, 1977).  
The accounting practised at trading stations facilitated financial administration and making 
basic operating decisions. Presumably, it comprised basic commercial bookkeeping reflecting 
financial structures, a mixture of agency, branch and proprietary capital. This was used to 
finance imported fixed assets and to carry stock[21]. When a ship called to collect the copra 
accumulated by the trader, probably over several months on remoter islands, the trader 
received his price, or the agent his wages and commission, and replenished his stock of trade 
goods. The time elapsing between ships entailed significant investment in stock, although as 
now even with sufficient capital and good planning it was usual for stocks of some items to 
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be exhausted some time before the next ship, and it too might have run out of or not have 
been loaded with said items.  
Companies often recruited agents at their substantive places of business (e.g. Sydney, Apia) 
on the criteria of knowledge, skills and reliability, because of the capital that these companies 
entrusted to them, and their willingness to live remotely. Notwithstanding possible German 
and Chinese influence, most of it originated one way or another from the British Isles, for 
example via penal and settler colonies in what are now Australia, NZ, California and New 
England (see Carnegie and Parker (1996), and Chua and Poullaos (2002) re the transfer of 
British accounting technology to the European-settler colonies of the Pacific). Once in the 
Gilberts, it was learnt from husbands (e.g. Ngangota Randell occasionally acted as trader and 
supercargo in the 1850s and 1860s, and Rakera Turner helped run the store at Nikumanu 
between the 1890s and 1930s – Maude, 1968, 1977b, and Sabatier, 1977), parents, other 
traders (e.g. Robert Corrie taught George Murdoch[22] – Grimble, 1952; Horwood, 1994) 
and through churches (e.g. among the subjects that Revd and Mrs Goward initiated on Beru 
in their boarding school for older boys and married couples from throughout the mission was 
bookkeeping and how to be a trader – the school’s main purpose was to train pastors). 
Regarding the effect of local use of accounting by I-Matang, it is as well to appreciate that as 
with some members of all other classes of I-Matang before and since, having arrived in the 
Gilberts voluntarily or involuntarily, resident traders often undertook their activities more to 
support a laid-back lifestyle in a paradise than as their raison d’être. Like those alluded to 
already (e.g. Murdoch, Redfern, Turner, the forbears of the Kum Kees), they invariably spoke 
I-Kiribati and adopted other local behaviours, married locally to women who then as now 
played significant roles in trading affairs, and produced descendants whom they often 
groomed as traders and also passed other trade skills on too (e.g. carpentry, mechanics), often 
fitting them for work as GEIP, GEIC and Republic Government administrators. Meanwhile, 
the Gilberts were not attractive to extensive commercial operations in copra or other 
commodities, and so unlike the Marshalls, Fiji, Samoa, etc., I-Kiribati were not troubled by 
companies bent on land appropriation and labour exploitation in situ[23], except later on 
Banaba, because of its phosphate (see below). 
The performance of accounting may have been confined mainly to I-Matang, their I-Kiribati 
wives, and offspring, and others working in I-Matang circles, but how it was practiced 
affected I-Kiribati with whom they were trading and, sometimes, casually employing. As 
with most accounting practiced by one group and affecting another, while I-Kiribati obtained 
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benefits in the form of the flow of trade goods, they were probably prone to disadvantages, 
not just on Kuria, for example, at the hands of Binoka. Notwithstanding many traders not 
being inclined towards aggressive economic exploitation either naturally or because of the 
need to minimise infractions of te katei and similar aspects of I-Kiribati culture, it is doubtful 
whether the goods being exchanged for copra by the 1870s reached 25% of its value in 
Sydney and further afield, although that was an improvement on the 5% reported earlier. In 
income per te I-Kiribati, this probably amounted to only a few dollars per year on most 
islands. Moreover, some disputes and incidents did occur that were grounded in economic 
matters, rather than in more usual social, political or religious infractions. Particularly 
notorious was a practice of advancing credit through the so-called clip system, which led to 
bitterly disputed debts and widespread grievances. It entailed a trader advancing credit to a 
landowner against a specified te aba and having the right to harvest copra from the coconut 
trees thereon for as long as the debt existed: an additional aspect was that clips began being 
traded. I-Matang accounting records notwithstanding, the accumulated disputes were 
resolved only when the islands were declared a British Protectorate, and indeed might be 
cited as one of the domestic reasons for that status coming about (Macdonald, 1982). In any 
case, I-Kiribati Governments incorporated into the structure of the GEIP Government 
accepted responsibility for debt servicing and repayment, which they made through 
communal collection of copra. Credit transactions since have continued to be problematic, 
and so unusual.  
Accountability to Jehovah 
This section is based on reviews of Ernst (1992), Garrett (1992), Goodall (1954), Grimble 
(1952, 1957), Knoll (1997), Macdonald (1971, 1972, 1982), Mason (1985), Maude (1963, 
1968) and Sabatier (1977). Word of Christianity was brought to Kiribati in the latter half of 
the 19th century by rival Protestant and Roman Catholic missions. For various reasons (e.g. an 
alternative religion provided by the impressive, knowledgeable, technologically superior I-
Matang, a written version of te taetae ni Kiribati and books translated into it, 
knowledge/stories about elsewhere in the world), it so appealed to I-Kiribati that in less than 
three decades a significant majority were members of one of these congregations. Thus, 
Christianity at least seemed to take precedence over and in many respects to have displaced 
much of the long-established religion as an integral part of social and material culture, 
although the latter was and still is revived occasionally. In addition, from the 1870s to the 
1910s, mwaneaba districts in the southern Gilberts particularly changed from gerontocracies 
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into theocracies almost, under the political control of the Samoan pastor and then I-Matang 
missionary representatives of the North-West Outstations of the Samoan branch of the 
London Missionary Society (LMS).  
Regarding the accounting they conferred on I-Kiribati, axiomatic is that the Christians 
introduced the accountability-related concepts of preparing for the next world and the Day of 
Reckoning. This competed with and subsequently fused with the previously ascendant 
solidarity with and accountability to one’s utu and boti (including bakatibu), although the 
institution of boti went into terminal decline at this time[24]. The LMS’s Samoan pastors in 
particular placed a “strong emphasis on the rewards of heaven and the punishments of hell” 
(Macdonald, 1982, p. 43), and started to build up laws to curtail situations and behaviours 
that were a normal part of I-Kiribati life (e.g. nakedness[25], eiriki and tinaba relationships 
(Grimble, 1957), birth control through abortion and infanticide, adoption, keeping relics in 
mwaneaba, each kainga maintaining te bangota (i.e. a shrine) with a stone symbolising te 
anti (a spirit, possibly of the first human bakatibu of the boti), the various forms of dance (see 
Dambiec, 2005; Whincup, 2005)). These laws also instituted Sabbath observance (e.g. 
attending church, a ban on working, playing games and other recreation), and by inference, 
days of the week (e.g. Moanibong (or first day) = Monday, Kaonobong (or sixth day) = 
Saturday). As more and more mwaneaba districts were converted, their unimane 
enthusiastically passed more of these laws. They became so wide ranging that everyone was 
bound to break one regularly. Moreover, unimane appointed a copious force of kaubure (i.e. 
policemen and wardens) to enforce them[26], so that most breaches were found out. 
Furthermore, despite what turned out as barely effective opposition from a few traders and 
Roman Catholics, the laws applied to everyone, leading to what Sabatier described as 
“constant tyranny from the Protestants” (1977, p. 181). 
Infractions of these multifarious laws were regarded as breaching church discipline, which 
initially was punishable on Earth only by exclusion from the church. However, after a 
mwaneaba district was converted, punishment changed, mostly to fines that were levied in 
copra and payable to the church. A substantial flow of copra ensued, droughts 
notwithstanding, and passed through the missions’ accounts, being applied to build not only 
churches but also grand dwellings for pastors, who along with their I-Kiribati deacons, some 
of them unimane, had a life of relative leisure and affluence. Most I-Kiribati seemed prepared 
to accept this, seeing the pastor as “a living example of the accomplishments that could 
follow from Christianity and civilisation” (Macdonald, 1982, p. 49). As alluded to already, 
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some pastors, Hawaiian[27] as well as Samoan, used the fines in copra as a basis of running 
businesses, trading goods for more copra and even using the notorious clip system to advance 
loans. Thus, when Captain Davis surveyed the Gilberts in 1892 in annexing them as the 
GEIP, he qualified notes about the presence of pastors on islands by whether they were 
trading (see Resture, 2004).  
Pastors performed their island missions with much autonomy from the LMS and ABCFM. 
Oversight visits by I-Matang missionaries from bases in Hawaii and Samoa were short, no 
more frequent than annual and taken up with ceremonials (e.g. school prize-giving). The 
people involved in the LMS in London were Victorian businessmen (e.g. Sir Albert Spicer, 
the international paper merchant, was its treasurer c. 1890, according to Garrett, 1992) and 
took a keen interest in fundraising and allocating funds throughout the mission (see Goodall, 
1954), but this does not seem to have extended to any form of annual financial evaluation and 
audit of these outstation missions during these annual visits. In any case, many of the visitors 
were impressed by the results the pastors were achieving, and so supported the methods they 
used.  
Although the GEIP Government curtailed the above practices from the mid-1890s in the 
north and central islands, including through appointing a few I-Matang to government agent, 
interpreter and tax collector positions, they went largely unchecked until 1900 in the LMS-
controlled south, where there was no agent of the GEIP/GEIC Government in residence until 
1917. What did change the situation in the south was the arrival of the first resident I-Matang 
LMS missionary, William Goward, but this was like going from the frying pan into the fire. 
Goward was aghast at the “inconsistent, incompetent and un-Christ-like” (Macdonald, 1982, 
p. 89) behaviour of the Samoans and set out to replace them with I-Kiribati that he would 
train himself. He established his headquarters on Beru and for most of the next 20 years 
played a domineering politico-religious part in the changing way of life on the southern 
islands. By then, his methods and behaviour, including controlling appointments to official 
positions held by I-Kiribati (which all went to Protestant minions), attracted as much 
criticisms as he had levelled at the pastors. This came from the Catholics (including Sabatier, 
1977) and the GEIC Government, notably Southern District Officer Grimble (1918-1920), 
who was appalled by how representatives of the LMS had made te I-Kiribati ashamed of his 
ancestry, history, legends and “practically of everything that ever happened to his race 
outside the chapel and the class room” (Grimble cited by Macdonald, 1982, p. 133). Goward 
retired in 1917 and his successor, George Eastman, was much less controversial, as he 
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involved himself much less in secular politics per se than either the pastors or Goward, and 
he lasted until 1947. The intense newfound accountability that I-Kiribati had to Jehovah 
continued developing, however, and Sabbath observance, etc. are still much in evidence, 
particularly on Outer Islands.   
As regards administrative accounting of the missions, Sabatier (1977) makes by-the-by 
references to administration, budgets and accounts of the Roman Catholic mission. In 
describing its early activities, he writes of the “mission’s slender budget” (p. 210) and its 
“terrible financial difficulties” (p. 318). Goodall (1954) reports about the Protestant missions 
after the Samoans and Hawaiians were repatriated and mentions that Goward, Eastman and 
one of their support staff, William Levett, included administrative and accounting skills 
among their strengths. Fundraising was of significance to both missions and to their I-Kiribati 
flocks. Funds were needed to pay for wooden and then cement churches, replete with bell 
towers and stained glass windows; and to meet costs of religious and educational activities. 
Roman Catholic funds were supplemented by various Pacific- and French-based benefactors, 
and by I-Kiribati, who often made subscriptions. The Protestant approach seems to have been 
for congregations to do most of the contributing, including by performing valuable work 
(except on Sundays). Nowadays, that takes the form of running mronron (i.e. informal and 
unregistered cooperative trade stores) being run among church congregations (and other 
social groups), as I saw on Tarawa and Nikunau. I also realised that women on Nikunau spent 
much of their time producing handicrafts (e.g. coconut mats, fishing hats, shark’s teeth 
knives) for sale on Tarawa, to I-Matang “tourists”. Church fundraising on Nikunau seemed to 
be a significant pastime that absorbed much of the small amount of money circulating there. 
Although some of this cash was to meet church expenses there, much of it seemed to be sent 
to Tarawa. This was replicated on other Outer Islands, spurred on by occasional competitions 
for which island could donate the most to Kiribati Protestant Church (KPC) headquarters on 
Tarawa. Assuming this fundraising was typical of Goward’s time, perhaps it was not the 
inventive fundraising activities of the Samoan pastors that gave him offence, but the way the 
funds were openly misappropriated for personal Earthly benefit.  
Accounting Amidst Protectorate, Colony and Republic Government  
Elsewhere (Dixon, 2007a), I have analysed descriptively how accounting was used in the 
GEIP, GEIC and Republic of Kiribati Governments, showing that the accounting of these 
institutions was largely about I-Kiribati, and not to I-Kiribati. Work I reviewed included 
GEIC (1974), Grimble (1952, 1957), Grimble and Clarke (1929), Macdonald (1971, 1972, 
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1982), Mason (1985), Maude (1963, 1968, 1977b), Sabatier (1977) and Van Trease (1993). 
Significant are the ways that accounting has been used to formulate, express and justify 
policies and to execute policies to organise, control and legitimise behaviour. Increasingly, 
these ways formed part of a web of governmental institutions that accounting reflected, 
reinforced and helped constitute; and into which I-Kiribati were drawn by I-Matang. At best, 
these I-Matang acted paternalistically, in the sense of believing they knew what would be 
best for I-Kiribati. Although I-Kiribati took charge of this web under the Republic 
Government, where I-Matang contract staff and, more recently, consultants have been 
involved paternalism has tended to prevail. Otherwise, I-Kiribati have taken charge but with 
little experience, and they have been prone to mimic how they perceived that I-Matang who 
preceded them behaved, as well as try to bring their own ways to bear on how institutions 
function. In this, accounting has turned into (or arguably remained) something of an 
institutional ritual.  
Regarding framing policies, I induced eight phases looking at events through an accounting 
lens. First, during the 19th century, I-Matang imperial powers were involved in a Pacific-wide 
informal imperialism (Davie, 2000), as fostered by I-Matang discussed in the previous 
sections; by I-Matang warships on patrol under the Pacific Islanders Protection Convention to 
inspire “good behaviour” (Sabatier, 1977, p. 148); and by the appointment of the Governor of 
Fiji as British High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Britain for one was reluctant to 
formalise a territory’s colonial status unless revenues were likely to sustain administration 
expenditures, without contributions from the British Exchequer (Morgan, 1980). The Gilberts 
were thought incapable of doing so, and the GEIP only came about as a result of an Anglo-
German agreement of 1886 about several global matters, and even then Britain delayed for 
six years.  
Second, Britain instructed the first resident commissioner, Charles Swayne (1893-95) that as 
soon as possible no contributions from Imperial funds should be necessary to pay for GEIP 
administration (Morgan, 1980). This obliged Swayne and his successor Campbell to make the 
best of the existing I-Kiribati Governments mentioned above, as they set about what I-
Matang saw as eliminating savagery, instilling peace and public order, and building 
civilisation, not to mention resolving trading, land and religious disputes among groups 
mentioned in the previous sections. Swayne’s Native Laws 1894 placed a duty these 
governments to levy a Sovereign’s tax to pay for GEIP administration. Campbell appointed I-
Matang traders to government agent, interpreter and tax collector positions to oversee them, 
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and increase the yield from this tax, enabling the administration to grow without exceeding 
its revenues. 
Third, in 1908, the GEIP/GEIC Residency moved from the Gilberts to Banaba, where it 
remained until being evacuated in 1941. Phosphate was discovered on Banaba in 1900 and 
mining operations were industrialised by private companies and under the BPC. Facilitating 
the success of mining and the benefits it provided to British, and later Australian and NZ, 
interests became the main issue for the GEIP and then GEIC Governments. Although 
phosphate was potentially a significant source of finance with which to expand GEIP/GEIC 
Government activities into social and other services and economic development, that barely 
happened until the 1970s. Indeed, as resident commissioner, Grimble implemented ideas of 
keeping the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (as distinct from Banaba) “a close preserve inviolate 
from European rapacity, aided by the fact that there were no natural resources except a little 
copra to exploit” (Maude, 1977a, p. v). Under what Lundsgaarde (1974) and Maude refer to 
as a museum policy, Grimble envisaged I-Kiribati resuming a simple, somewhat Spartan life, 
as per his somewhat romanticised view of I-Kiribati society (Grimble, 1952, 1957). 
Naturally, the BPC lent its support to this policy because the financial demands it entailed 
from the GEIC Government would be minimal (Macdonald, 1982). 
Fourth, during the 1930s, British officials in Suva and the Gilberts came to deplore the 
ascendancy of the BPC, and the state of the GEIC and the paralysis of its Government 
(Macdonald, 1982). They were spurred on by concerns to raise standards of living throughout 
Britain’s colonies (Morgan, 1980). Although these ideas were distracted by WWII, and 
worldwide shortages of finance, materials and skilled labour in its aftermath, Resident 
Commissioner Maude (1946-48) proceeded with a new policy of decentralised 
modernisation, but more slowly and with more economy than he originally imagined, but 
then things stalled under his conservative successor, John Peel (1948-51).  
Fifth, decentralisation was replaced with centralisation under Resident Commissioner 
Michael Bernacchi (1952-61), as he went about resolving delays in modernising projects 
already underway and getting more off the ground. More so than economic development per 
se, he was concerned about providing modern amenities, including for I-Matang officials and 
public service professionals (e.g. teachers, doctors, engineers) in order to recruit them more 
easily, and he gradually stepped up the rate of modernising within his field of vision on 
Tarawa. Much tangible and administrative infrastructure of national significance accumulated 
there, including governmental accounting systems that ran up and down through a centralised 
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I-Matang-run bureaucracy, and migrants began to be attracted there from Outer Islands, as 
analysed elsewhere (Dixon, 2007b). Like Maude before him, Bernacchi was concerned to 
contain recurrent expenditure because of what would happen once Banaba’s (wasting) 
phosphate asset was exhausted and the still derisory revenue from there ceased. This concern 
mirrored a fear held by the British Government about colonies not being able to sustain 
welfare services without subsidies from Britain once they were independent (Morgan, 1980). 
Containing costs, facilitating direct (eyeball) control, rendering scale economies and being 
more efficient were among the justifications for centralisation. Bernacchi also saw the 
prospect of cessation of mining as a reason to save and invest, and so he had the significant 
idea of establishing the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF) and thereby create a 
stream of investment income (GEIC, 1957; Macdonald, 1982; Pretes and Petersen, 2002). 
Resident Commissioner Andersen (1962-69) provided a further twist, changing the thinking 
from infrastructure and amenity planning within projected funds, to development planning 
based on need, and procuring funds accordingly (e.g. from the BPC and British 
Government’s Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (CDWF)). Modernising on Tarawa 
continued into the 1970s, and gave rise to its high growth in population, which is still 
ensuing[28] and which the ADB now views as “a worrisome trend” because it has “degraded 
the environment and increased economic frustration” (2006, p. 1).  
Sixth, the first Te Beretitenti of the Republic, Ieremia Tabai (1979-91) promoted a preference 
for a simple lifestyle and I-Kiribati values. The Republic Government faced a substantial 
(approximate $10m) annual shortfall in the recurrent budget that it inherited from the GEIC 
Government because mining revenue ceased. However, this was met from grants-in-aid that 
Britain had reluctantly agreed to provide in the Independence settlement. But Ieremia 
intended to bring these grants-in-aid from Britain to a premature end to symbolise 
independence from the former imperial power, and succeeded by implementing policies to 
increase revenue (e.g. the first fishing licences negotiated with Japan) and contain operating 
expenditure and the infrastructure investment that would cause it to increase. Thus, the level 
of modernising activities reduced, but only for a while, as it turned out (Macdonald, 1982). 
Seventh, as time passed, so more organisations discovered the new Republic (see list in 
World Bank, 2005), coinciding with the substantial global expansion of the aid industry in the 
last 25 years (Burall, Maxwell and Menocal, 2006; OECD, 2007). They have persuaded 
successive Republic Governments to accept guidance, influence, advice and capital 
donations-in-kind (or sometimes in cash), thus reviving modernisation with some vigour in 
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the 1990s and 2000s. Employing operating staff and meeting running costs have invariably 
been assigned to the Republic Government, thus giving rise to a 250% increase in 
expenditure in real terms between 1985 and 2001. This has been met from increased revenue 
yields from import duties, income and profits taxes, charges for government services, the 
proceeds of fishing licence fees and, occasionally, applying investment income from the 
RERF (Government of Kiribati, 2007). The effect of this activity is plain to see on Tarawa, in 
terms of inward migration from Outer Islands and population growth, and increases in 
buildings and other structures, motor vehicles and rubbish. 
Eighth, as analysed elsewhere (Dixon, 2004a), the modernisers have been challenged by neo-
liberalisers associated with international financial institutions, primarily the ADB, assisted 
from Australia and NZ. They have advocated structural adjustment policies grounded in 
development theories adhering primarily to market fundamentalist ideology, rather than 
intervention. Essentially the policies comprise deregulating international and domestic trade, 
allowing foreign nationals to establish businesses and be employed, reducing government 
fiscal policy interventions, privatising government enterprises, otherwise curtailing the scope 
and size of public services and reducing government expenditure, and improving the 
performance and public accountability of the government. The main targets for 
disestablishment or reform are the very public services, government enterprises and 
associated structures, processes and procedures that I-Matang gifted to I-Kiribati at 
Independence and since. However, because of the RERF and fishing revenues, Kiribati is not 
dependent on aid, and so the Republic Government has been able to absorb the pressure to 
implement these policies seriously. Indeed, the Republic Government and its multifarious aid 
partners are still the dominant new investor in business operations, as well as in infrastructure 
and facilities to provide public services.  
Regarding implementing policies, since being incepted by Swayne, accounting as used as part 
of government has changed invariably incrementally according to circumstances of the GEIP, 
GEIC and Republic and the changing policies enumerated above. Consequently, in the 
institutions now comprising the Republic Government and functioning under a mix of 
modernisation and neo-liberal policy rhetoric, the accounting bears resemblances to that used 
in the GEIC and GEIP Governments. At various times, its use has reflected, reinforced and 
constituted an almost continuous series of hierarchically structured, mostly authoritarian and 
decidedly paternalistic administrations between the 1890s and at least until Andersen began 
introducing internal self-government and arguably until Independence 1970s, as painted  by 
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Macdonald (1971, 1972, 1982), with I-Matang in the ascendancy and I-Kiribati Governments 
beneath. An example of the structure from Dixon (2007b) is shown in Figure 2. This is as 
seen looking up from Nikunau and as it had evolved by c. 1920. Unsurprisingly, it bore many 
similarities in form and rationale to that described by Davie (2000) in relation to Fiji c. 1880. 
Although modified several times (see Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982), this general format 
prevailed until the 1970s, except the Residency was on Tarawa after 1944.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Initially, how accounting was practiced as part of GEIP and GEIP Government was 
undoubtedly influenced by expectations that high commissioners had of Swayne, Campbell, 
etc., and traders and phosphate staff taken on in government agent positions. Increasingly, the 
experience that I-Matang staff brought with them from other colonies and Britain played a 
part, as did the post-war supervision of GEIC Government finances by HM Treasury. More 
expertise arrived as the GEIC Government elaborated and extended accounting and related 
systems after 1950, hand in glove with expanding the scope and scale of its activities. All 
these processes and systems were paper-based, many still surviving today alongside 
computerised ones that began being introduced in the 1980s. They were sustained by a few I-
Matang accountants supported by a disproportionate number of Tuvaluan clerks, who mainly 
decamped to Funafuti in 1976, and I-Kiribati ones.  
Accounting revolved around an annual cycle of activities: annual estimating of revenues and 
expenditures on recurrent and capital items; the resident commissioner authorising these, 
except from 1941 to 1955 when approval had to come from HM Treasury in London because 
of the grants-in-aid entailed in re-establishing the administration after WWII; taxes and 
revenues being collected and expenditures incurred, incidental to which a myriad of prime 
documents were prepared and accounting records were maintained; monitoring actual 
revenues and expenditures compared with budgets, and making budget and operational 
adjustments accordingly; closing the accounts at the year-end; and auditing the final accounts 
and reporting them to the resident commissioner, the high commissioner and London, where 
a financial summary was published as part of biennial (and later annual) reports for the years 
from 1896 to 1974 (e.g. GEIC, 1957, 1974). This was the limit of how accounts fitted into 
public accountability, a belief having arisen among I-Kiribati that, even though the 
GEIP/GEIC Government or Te Tautaeka provided some services and funds, it was alien and 
belonged to I-Matang[29]. Before WWII, officials of the Pacific Phosphate Co. and BPC 
used the estimates process to challenge the GEIP and GEIC Governments from time to time 
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over how much they intended spending, and so trying to negotiate revenue from these mining 
organisations (e.g. in the early 1920s, the BPC persuaded the Governor of Fiji and the 
Colonial Office in London that the administration of the GEIC was unnecessarily expensive, 
leading to cuts in staffing and the sale of the GEIC Government’s ship, and so a cut in district 
officer visibility on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.). After WWII, the accounts told a story of 
GEIC Government recurrent expenditure growing from just over AU$0.5 million in 1950 to 
AU$9.5 million in 1976, mainly to pay for the increasingly elaborate public service 
bureaucracy and meet net costs of distribution and other quasi commercial activities, which 
came to be set up on trading bases, giving rise to governmental enterprise accounting (see 
below). In addition, as much modernising was increasingly implemented on a project basis 
and financed with specific capital grants, so individual project accounts were more in 
evidence (Grimble, 1952, 1957; Grimble and Clarke, 1929; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982; 
Morgan, 1980).  
The processes and systems were largely intended for use by senior I-Matang officials until 
internal I-Kiribati-rule was gradually implemented. From 1967, a succession of 
representative and executive bodies formally took on progressively more authority, including 
for approving annual estimates and having sole power to introduce proposals involving 
financial appropriations. However, I-Matang continued to occupy all senior public service 
positions and the financial secretary always held the finance portfolio. Macdonald (1972, 
1982) exemplifies how accounting was one of the ways these I-Matang officials absorbed 
criticism, with such ruses as providing minimal information in a complex fashion or denying 
certain information existed. I-Kiribati representatives had to follow procedures based on the 
Parliament in Westminster, which were founded on adversity, and not on consensus; and, 
following custom, would abstain from free discussion if it meant challenging estimates and 
other proposals made by an established authority (e.g. the resident commissioner). They also 
had to rely significantly on papers written exclusively in English by officials, including 
budgeting and accounting information. The planning and evaluation this was geared to 
support continued to be based on such I-Matang ideas as neo-classical economic rationality 
using management control structures and processes. No one adapted the accounting 
technology to the Kiribati context, and so the data generated by it did not reflect beliefs, 
values, culture and social arrangements of I-Kiribati and the environmental conditions they 
faced then or subsequently. Thus, leading I-Kiribati were denied any real role in policy 
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formulation and strategic implementation by I-Matang officials virtually until Independence 
and Ieremia Tabai took office.  
A not surprising consequence of this denial was that when Constitution of Kiribati 1979 was 
written for the Republic there was little challenge to most elements of the structure and 
process being embedded in it. This included the canon of no taxation without representation, 
whereby the executive (i.e. Kabinet and ministries) must obtain the approval of the legislature 
(i.e. Te Mwaneaba ni Maungatabu) before assessing and collecting revenues, raising loans 
and incurring expenditures; and must present its accounts for audit by the legislature, 
specifically the auditor-general and the Kiribati National Audit Office (KNAO). How these 
bodies are arrayed in the structure is shown in Figure 3, with accounting and finance areas 
elaborated (for more details see Dixon, 2004a, 2007a).  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Moreover, as I-Kiribati had little opportunity to learn to the detail of implementing policies 
particularly in the areas of finance, accounting, economics and planning, these areas 
continued to be sustained by a few I-Matang, including accountants, in line management and 
operational positions supported by I-Kiribati juniors; and the changeover from I-Matang to I-
Kiribati was more prolonged than in other parts of the public service. Even then, I-Matang 
consulting activity in them was significant, taking such forms as advising senior officials, 
working alongside counterparts in middle-level posts, and providing education and training. 
Furthermore, new computer hardware and software and similar technical installations and 
systems development have invariably been through separate, intermittent projects led by I-
Matang consultants, with consequences that changes have occurred piecemeal, without 
coordination (e.g. a new computer system here and a training programme there), by discrete 
leaps, and leaving I-Kiribati operators with sheer learning curves and ignorance of how new 
technology has evolved elsewhere from the old, not that they may have adequately 
understood the old technically, rationally or socially in any case[30].  
Alongside computerisation, the aforementioned growth of aid industry activity has been the 
other significant external contingency affecting government accounting since Independence. 
This has entailed dealing with a wide range of donors and the varying and increasingly 
elaborate accounting requirements they demand of the Republic Government. These relate to 
planning and ex ante evaluation of projects (see Rondinelli, 1993); and implementing, 
monitoring, controlling and acquitting aid-in-cash projects, entailing variations among donors 
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and across time in charts of accounts, forms of statements, coverage of non-financial matters, 
frequencies of reports and changes to requirements (Burall, Maxwell and Menocal, 2006; 
Hove, 1986). Other issues among government institutions were that political, social and 
administrative criteria were ascendant in determining which development projects 
materialised; complications arose from the sheer number of projects and the number of 
ministries they were scattered around; there was a backlog of acquittals (NZ Official 
Development Assistance, 1999); and as all cash-in-aid was banked in one account and project 
accounting records were imperfect, disputes had arisen about funds meant for some projects 
being spent on other things. Donor dissatisfaction with accounting arrangements was 
contributing to an increasing trend for aid to be in kind. Much aid was in this form in any 
case, in order that donors could supply labour, goods and services to benefit not only Kiribati 
as the recipient country but also organisations and workers from the donor country. 
Accounting Amidst Phosphate Mining and Distribution 
I have already made several references to mining of Banaba, where phosphate was discovered 
in 1900 and which became part of the GEIP shortly after. Mining operations were quickly 
industrialised allowing over 20 million tonnes of phosphate to be extracted and shipped in 80 
years, mainly to Australia and New Zealand (ANZ). Banaba was virtually the only case in the 
GEIP/GEIC where the indigenous people were troubled by I-Matang bent on land 
appropriation and labour exploitation in situ. The GEIP/GEIC Residency was located there 
from 1908 to 1941 as facilitating the success of mining and the benefits it provided to British 
and ANZ interests became the main issue for the GEIP and then GEIC Governments. When 
mining resumed in 1946, the BPC had Banaba to themselves, the GEIC Government having 
re-located to Tarawa and re-located the Banabans to Rabi, Fiji. Although phosphate was 
potentially a significant source of finance with which to expand GEIP/GEIC Government 
activities into social and other services, and to promote economic development, that barely 
happened until the mid 1960s. Indeed, the phosphateers, be they in the guise of the Pacific 
Islands Co., Pacific Phosphate Co. or BPC, acted on Banaba and in Suva, London, Canberra 
and Wellington to resist this idea. Pacific Phosphate Co. benefited from the expropriation of 
Island Fund balances by the GEIP in 1914. BPC persuaded the relevant authorities that the 
administration of the GEIC was unnecessarily expensive on at least two occasions in the 
1920s and 1930s, leading to GEIC Government expenditure estimates being reduced 
accordingly, and was supportive of the GEIC Government’s frugal museum policy of the late 
1920s and 1930s. Their “campaign of Government economy” (Sir Arthur Richards, High 
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Commissioner for the Western Pacific (1936-1938) as quoted in Macdonald, 1982, p. 122) 
was not undermined until after Nauru gained Independence in 1965 and took over its own 
mining, and the price of ore now purchased from there by the BPC increased to reflect world 
market prices. Concerns of senior colonial officials about the financial viability of the GEIC 
and Republic after mining would cease became increasingly myopic in the last 30 years of 
the GEIC. The “Banaban problem” delayed Kiribati’s Independence by several months. 
Shortly after Independence, the last shipment of ore left Banaba and the BPC wound up its 
operations there in 1980. The present day plight of Banabans and the dilapidated state of their 
homelands[31] still causes them resentment and attracts outside condemnation (Barraclough, 
1977; Cooper, 1995; King and Sigrah, 2004; Macdonald, 1982; Williams and Macdonald, 
1985). In 2007, annual reports of the BPC to the commissioners for the final three years of 
mining were still closed documents in the National Archives in London, being subject to the 
30-year rule, like other miscellaneous BPC records of the same period held there. Thus, 
somewhat ironically in these days of transparency of governmental bodies, reports about the 
last few years of mining will only become accessible between 2007 and 2011. 
The BPC came about through the Nauru Island Agreement 1919 and acquired the mining 
rights and facilities on Banaba as an adjunct to purchasing mining rights and facilities on 
Nauru from the Pacific Phosphate Co. in the aftermath of WWI. It was a “nonprofit” joint 
venture of the Australian, NZ and British Governments. It finances were entirely separate 
from the partner governments (and from the GEIC Government), and the Agreement 
provided for them not to interfere in BPC activities. Each appoint a commissioner to the 
three-man commission and they were appointed with mining, agricultural and fertiliser 
industry issues in mind, not public accountability to citizens of the democracies who 
appointed them, much less Banabans, I-Kiribati or Nauruans. Although they were quite 
active in its governance from time to time, Macdonald describes the BPC as “something of a 
self-perpetuating oligarchy” (1982, p. 275) ruled by its senior staff based in Melbourne, 
Australia.  
BPC’s modus operandi was to mine ore from Banaba, Nauru and, after 1949, the Christmas 
Island in the Indian Ocean, using I-Kiribati and other non-I-Matang labour, and to ship most 
of it to its depots at various ports adjacent to farming areas in need of fertiliser in Australia 
and NZ. A small quantity of ore also went to Britain[32]. The ore was sold at prices 
calculated only to recover BPC’s costs, as defined in the Agreement (i.e. working expenses, 
cost of management, contribution to expenses of the Australian-run Nauru Government (and 
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the GEIC Government), interest on capital, a sinking fund for capital redemption and other 
charges agreed to unanimously by the commissioners). From 1920 to 1940, the prices that 
ANZ farmers paid for fertiliser were barely two-thirds the price ruling on the world market, 
and something of this sort prevailed until the late 1960s (c. 1953, A. H Gaze, BPC’s general 
manager 1920-54 is quoted in Williams and Macdonald (1985) as indicating that the price 
was only a quarter of the price elsewhere). They were obliged to sell their produce through 
marketing boards at a price that reflected the cheap fertiliser they were supplied with not only 
to ANZ households but also to British ones, which until the 1970s was the dominant 
agricultural export market of ANZ. Small quantities of ore were sold elsewhere at market 
prices by BPC (e.g. to Japan up to 1941, Malaysia) and the contribution from these sales 
reducing the unit-cost prices of sales in ANZ and Britain (King and Sigrah, 2004; Williams 
and Macdonald, 1985).  
Judged from the annual reports that were furnished to its three commissioners but not 
published (e.g. BPC, 1974), this modus operandi was reflected in the BPC's accounting 
practices, along with its nonprofit designation and its needs not only to determine costs, and 
so prices, but also its aim to contain them, giving rise to an efficient and controlled factory-
like set up on all three islands. It was concerned that the unit-cost prices at which it 
distributed phosphate fertiliser in Australia and New Zealand (and Britain) were as low as 
possible. I inspected reports for a sample of years from the 1920s through to the 1970s and 
noticed a standard pattern. They show tonnage mined, shipped and distributed; the costs of 
extraction and distribution operations, and unit costs; revenues derived from sale of ore; and 
moderate annual surpluses. The reports are quite elaborate with supporting schedules, tables 
and notes, all with a costing focus, giving the impression that the idea of containing costs was 
pursued unfailingly on behalf of its principals. However, costs of I-Matang managerial staff  
and other management items seem not as elaborated as they could be in the reports, which 
could lead one to speculate about whether these were as economic as they might have been. 
Macdonald (1982) reports that mine-based staff (as distinct from labourers) enjoyed an 
enviable standard of conditions on Banaba and effectively paid no income taxes to the GEIC 
(or to anyone else probably); and that the BPC’s Melbourne headquarters were lavish. 
Indeed, it was in Melbourne that most of BPC’s accounting was performed, reflecting 
circumstances of similar colonial enterprises elsewhere (e.g. plantations in Trinidad and 
Tobago, studied by Annisette, 2000), and their annual reports were audited by a private 
accounting firm there.  
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Regarding access to the BPC’s accounts by the GEIC Government, it was provided with 
summary accounting statements but was not allowed to scrutinise the BPC’s accounting 
records in order to verify these statements or go in any detail into the organisation’s finances 
and its ability to contribute more to the GEIC (Macdonald, 1982). While it may be construed 
that the Dickson, Grimble and other pre-WWII administrations did seek to increase amounts 
that the BPC contributed, this did not fit with the colonial philosophy of the times until just 
before WWII (Morgan, 1980). However, afterwards the British-oriented GEIC Government 
made various demands for a greater share of the value of the ore and about other matters from 
the ANZ-oriented BPC, and London and Canberra/Wellington got involved in what went 
from some “amicable horse-trading” (Williams and Macdonald, 1985, p. 420) to relations 
that were increasingly strained. The GEIC Government needed money to fund post-war 
rehabilitation and modernisation in the wider GEIC, and then to provide I-Kiribati with a 
legacy on which to draw after mining ended. However, up the early 1960s, only tens of 
thousands of Australian dollars were forthcoming each year from the BPC (including on 
behalf of its employees) as royalties and in lieu of the taxes, import duties, etc. that applied to 
residents and organisations elsewhere in the GEIC. But by the mid-1960s, GEIC officials 
were becoming more successful in dragooning royalties from the BPC, and these increased 
from a miserly AU$1 per tonne in 1954 to a still derisory AU$4 in 1966, with 15% going to 
Kain Banaba, who by now were also demanding some compensation for their treatment, etc. 
However, it was not until the last decade or so of mining that the payments became 
substantial and better reflected the value of the ore on the world market, which quadrupled in 
the oil crisis of 1973-74, although they had fallen back by 1977 (thus, AU$40 per tonne in 
1975 and AU$20 per tonne in 1977). Save for this increase in payments, the BPC appears to 
have resisted accountability to the GEIC Government, much less to any I-Kiribati, whom it 
saw for most of the mining period merely as labourers, or troublesome landowners in the case 
of Kain Banaba, rather than as “stakeholders” (GEIC, 1957, 1968, 1974; King and Sigrah, 
2004; Williams and Macdonald, 1985).  
Accounting about I-Kiribati Governments 
I have already referred to the circumstances of I-Kiribati Governments at three particular 
stages. They existed before I-Matang, contrary to how I-Kiribati and similar Pacific peoples 
were described in the more disparaging rhetoric: for example, as “various tribes of savages 
who are subject to no laws” (Wilson to British ships operating from the Australia Station 
cited by Macdonald, 1982, p. 65) (see also Gibson, 2000; Greer and Patel, 2000; Kearins and 
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Hooper, 2002). By the 1890s, direct involvement of missionaries, particularly in the southern 
Gilberts, had altered them significantly, changes being to religious attributes, laws they 
enacted and enforced, and sources and applications of revenues. Incidentally, whaling and oil 
trading also affected them, but in a roundabout way, relatively speaking. During the 1890s, 
Swayne and Campbell started to use them to further GEIP Government policies. They toured 
the islands frequently and appointed I-Matang government agents to oversee them. They 
implemented Native Laws 1894, under which they were designated as native 
governments[33]. Frustrated by the enduring authority of unimane, Campbell replaced the 
latter on their governing councils with younger men. He attempted to compile land registers 
for each island, unsuccessfully as it turned out (Baaro, 1987), and introduced the first in a 
generally accepted series of land taxes. Regarding how I-Kiribati should behave, he enacted 
Island Regulations 1908 to replace the varying regulations that had accumulated on each 
island, although these were not applied south of Tabiteuea, where regulations the LMS in 
effect dictated held sway until c. 1918 (Macdonald, 1971; Sabatier, 1977).  
Campbell’s successors, Dickson (1908-13) and Eliot (1913-21), needing to formalise control 
of the Gilberts and Ellice from Banaba, adapted the above as follows. They divided the 
Gilberts into three districts, with the Ellice making a fourth. An I-Matang district officer[34] 
was stationed in each (e.g. on Beru for the Southern Gilberts, as per Figure 2), with a wider 
range of duties than the agents had had. Variations to the composition, conduct and other 
matters about I-Kiribati Governments that they had implemented since 1908 were formalised 
in Revised Native Laws 1916. These circumstances prevailed by and large until the 
evacuation in 1941. They were affected in one direction by Grimble’s museum policy, 
including the infamously authoritarian Regulations for the Good Order (1930), which caused 
an MP to ask a question in the British House of Commons; and in another by early moves 
away from that policy towards modernising, as encapsulated in the Gilbert Islands, Island 
Regulations (1939) and the Native Government Ordinance 1941, which was not implemented 
until 1948. Even so, for most I-Kiribati, it was some combination of their unimane and their 
church officials who legitimately governed them (Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982). 
Significant from an accounting viewpoint in this requisitioning of I-Kiribati Governments as 
an adjunct to the GEIP/GEIC Government structure is that Native Laws 1894 provided that 
each I-Kiribati Government should maintain an Island Fund and stipulated that accounts be 
kept of it, including cashbooks, prison produce record books, and books of receipts and 
licences (for dogs and bicycles). This task fell to the scribe, one of several administrative I-
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Kiribati-held positions established in these laws and appointed by Campbell or his agents. An 
Island Fund balance represented an I-Kiribati government’s accumulated net surpluses, 
which it could apply in the future. These were in the supposedly safe-keeping of the GEIP 
Government, supposedly that is because of what occurred in 1914. Under a vague pretext of 
the Sovereign’s Tax having yielded insufficient to meet GEIP expenditures on the Gilberts 
and Ellice (as distinct from Banaba), thus shifting the burden of these to the Pacific 
Phosphate Company, the Secretary of State for the Colonies as good as directed that the 
aggregate £17,000 balances of Island Funds be expropriated as GEIP revenue and the Funds 
abolished. From then until the 1950s, all revenues collected by I-Kiribati Governments were 
deemed to belong to the GEIC Government, and each I-Kiribati Governments was only 
allowed to incur expenditures from appropriations allotted by the resident commissioner 
through the relevant district officer (Grimble and Clarke, 1929; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 
1982).  
This agency arrangement entailed I-Kiribati governments being involved in the GEIP/GEIC 
Government’s annual estimates process through their district officers, whose main point of 
contact in each government was the scribe. The scribe collected revenues, kept them intact 
and maintained accounts of them. In order to pay expenditures authorised by the GEIP/GEIC, 
Government, he also held an imprest established by the district officer, for which he also kept 
accounts. District officers were ex officio treasury sub-accountants, sub-collectors of customs, 
licensing officers and postmasters (including providing a rudimentary banking service mainly 
to relay remittances from Banaba, etc.). During intermittent visits to islands in their districts 
they carried with them a chest of cash, a travelling cashbook and other records, and a supply 
of official stationery. Along with several other tasks performed during a visit (see Grimble, 
1952, 1957), they audited the revenue and expenditure accounts, replenished the imprest and 
took away the revenue. Audits sometimes revealed issues that they judged to be poor internal 
control, shortcomings of accounting records, etc., although conversely, scribes sometimes 
complained that district officers made entries in their books that were not explained and that 
they found unintelligible. At their district headquarters, district officers maintained several 
books of account and record (e.g. a cash book, capitation tax register and departmental vote 
book). Periodically, they sent money and financial returns (e.g. monthly cash returns, 
quarterly capitation tax returns) to the treasury on Banaba. How well they completed this 
paperwork may be judged from an official reminder from Grimble and Clarke that, “The 
written word is vital to the ultimate success of the individual [colonial official] and his work,” 
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and “The keystone of enduring organisation is an efficient system of records” (1929, p. 29) 
(Macdonald, 1971, 1982). 
Although these accounting and related inter-island arrangements imply lively interactions 
between I-Kiribati Government officials, district officers and Residency-based staff, as with 
relations between Banaba (and later Tarawa), Suva and London, priorities (in this case, 
mining on Banaba (or later modernising Tarawa) over affairs on the other islands) and 
remoteness affected their significance and timeliness. District officers had always found it 
difficult to visit islands away from their district headquarters because they had to rely largely 
on ships collecting copra. These became increasingly infrequent through to the 1930s because 
of greater efficiency of shipping operations (i.e. fewer ships collecting greater volumes of 
cargo) and the decreasing prices of copra affecting production and making such operations 
increasingly uneconomic anyway. Lack of shipping also meant it was difficult to reach 
Banaba from the four district headquarters (later, Tarawa was not much more convenient, 
until air services were introduced c. 1970). However, while accounting processes were 
hampered as timely generators of information for central control by the resident 
commissioner at a distance, they also made amends for the economic and logistic 
impossibility of alternative, more direct controls (Macdonald, 1971, 1982).  
As far as I-Kiribati were concerned, accounting arrangements comprised unfamiliar 
processes, involved the unusual technology of writing, were conducted in a foreign language 
and gave rise to alien ideas around accountability. When added to wider circumstances of 
structure and process dating from Campbell’s time and alluded to earlier, it is hardly 
surprising that I-Kiribati came to perceive I-Kiribati Governments as mere extensions to Te 
Tautaeka, and so not belonging to them or affording them any public accountability through 
the official accounts. Thus, Macdonald opines that “island governments became little more 
than extensions of the central administration” (1971, p. 288); also arguing that, “the practice 
of governance, with its authoritarian structure and insistence on conformity was steadily 
eroding the indigenous capacity for self-rule” (1982, p. 137). A further indication of how I-
Kiribati Governments were regarded and figured on islands is that when GEIC administrators 
evacuated because of WWII, the I-Kiribati Governments on most islands soon expired and 
unimane reassumed overt political roles to exercise authority over social and economic life. 
However, account books and petty cash boxes were among symbols of British rule that some 
I-Kiribati Government officials preserved and hid from the Japanese, until the GEIC 
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Government was restored and I-Matang officials started re-establishing their version of I-
Kiribati Governments from the mid 1940s (Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982).  
This agency perception persisted after the restoration until at least the 1980s (Roniti, 1985), 
and possibly even continues today. This was despite several attempts by GEIC and Republic 
Government officials to curtail it. As analysed by Macdonald (1972, 1982), these involved 
revising the powers, membership, process and structure of I-Kiribati Governments, and 
relations they had with Tarawa. Regarding accounting, seemingly to increase I-Kiribati 
Governments’ autonomy, Island Funds were re-established via the Native Governments 
(Financial Powers) Ordinance 1955. However, I-Kiribati Government officials still had to 
partake in the GEIC Government’s annual estimates and accounting process, and they were 
expected to meet the salaries not only of their officials but also of I-Kiribati employees of the 
GEIC Government (e.g. teachers, medical staff) posted on their islands, including stemming 
from a flurry of modernisation projects (e.g. classrooms, clinics, staff houses, courthouses 
and I-Kiribati government buildings, water and sewerage systems, roads and causeways, and, 
in a few places, buses) in the late 1960s and 1970s. A further bleeding of Island Funds arose 
when the Island Courts Ordinance (1965) provided that these courts ceased being parts of I-
Kiribati Governments and became part of the GEIC judicial structure. This was accompanied 
somewhat controversially by fines they imposed being paid to the GEIC Government instead 
of into Island Funds. 
These changes to expenditure obligations and revenue sources caused most I-Kiribati 
Governments to have deficits. Initially, these were made good by the GEIC Government in 
the form of subventions to meet overall amounts. However, the closer financial supervision 
by district officers and other I-Matang officials that accompanied these subventions 
reinforced the agency perception. A further impediment was that those I-Kiribati 
Governments that were capable of generating an annual surplus avoided this if they could 
because half of any surplus had to be paid to the GEIC Government, which would use it in 
paying subventions to other islands. In an effort to rectify these shortcomings, the GEIC 
Government replaced subventions with specific capital grants and loans, increasingly for 
works that were formulated as development projects, and with specific recurrent grants to 
meet the costs of staff working on islands providing GEIC Government education, medical 
and other services (Macdonald, 1972, 1982). 
A personnel issue that had an effect up to the early 1970s was that district officials[35] spent 
increasingly more time on modern Tarawa and less at their sparse district headquarters 
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islands, let alone on the other islands in their districts. On visits they did make, they barely 
had time to deal with matters of immediate importance and meet senior officials. Thus, 
among other things, the quality and quantity of communication and advice they gave fell, 
which undoubtedly extended to poorer auditing and less interactive control, including through 
accounting. A further change from 1967 was that the positions of scribe and chief of kaubure 
were replaced with the single position of island executive officer. These positions were 
allotted to a new set of recruits to the local government service, trained on Tarawa and posted 
to islands, usually not their own. They proved to be a particularly weak link in the early days 
of the new system that the Local Government Ordinance (1966) introduced. In particular, 
there was an increase in the volume of work that the scribe and chief of kaubure would have 
had to handle, notably relating to centrally-imposed controls associated with modernising and 
public service expansion (e.g. annual estimates, grant applications, island development plans 
and similar paperwork in English). This now fell on the single-handed, inexperienced island 
executive officer taking over their duties, without much support from I-Matang district 
officials whose visits to many islands at this time were seldom. Continuing difficulties of 
communication from islands remote from Tarawa were accentuated by this growth of 
controls and need for approvals from resident commissioner or district officials. The work of 
the new island executive officers was not made easier by ignorance on islands of what the 
new system was about and a perception that it was another I-Matang impulse. A further 
problem was that being posted to islands not necessarily whence they originated meant they 
lacked aba on which to subsist in order to eke out their somewhat inadequate salaries. This 
probably accounted for the high incidence among them of theft of public funds and staff 
turnover (Macdonald, 1972, 1982).  
From the late 1960s, slightly better shipping and then an internal air service made touring by 
district officers easier. A further positive was that in 1974, the pre-war division of three 
districts for the Gilberts and one for the Ellice was restored and each was given a district 
officer normally resident there: the position of district commissioner was abolished. This 
prevailed until 1983, when an attempt to replace I-Matang with I-Kiribati was aborted 
because the idea of I-Kiribati from other islands/districts in such positions instead of I-
Matang was unacceptable to islanders (Roniti, 1985). Under the Local Government Act 1984, 
the position of island executive officer was replaced by two positions, clerk and treasurer. 
Regarding development projects, from the 1960s, the number undertaken varied from island 
to island and year to year. A significant factor was whether particular projects were regarded 
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by I-Kiribati as being “for the Government” (see note 30) and the disposition of unimane, 
whose authority endured as far as I-Kiribati were concerned, despite being formally ejected 
by Campbell from I-Kiribati Governments and having elected to be aloof from these for the 
several intervening decades and to exercise authority in lands courts and management 
committees of boboti (i.e. co-operative societies that) (see below). Unimane gave expression 
to this by on the one hand being reluctant to agree to tax increases that would be needed to 
provide local contributions towards a project’s costs; and by on the other making creative 
arrangements for funds to be raised under the auspices of kawa (i.e. villages)[36] and 
churches. Another factor was the restoration of the four districts in the Gilbert and Ellice and 
stationing of district officers in each. They were able to explain development ideas, and so 
influence councils and communities; and the number of projects increased. This development 
assistance from the GEIC Government helped broaden and improve its image from 
essentially an instrument for I-Matang control from Tarawa, to one of control that was 
accompanied by a source of funds. However, what it undertook on Outer Islands was far 
removed from what it did on Tarawa (Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982). 
This behaviour has been replicated by Republic Government administrations for the most 
part. Since Independence, the Island Councils provided for in Constitution of Kiribati 1979 
(see Figure 3) have continued in ways not much different from the I-Kiribati governments as 
they had evolved under the GEIC Government by the 1970s. They are subject to Government 
of Kiribati legislation (e.g. Local Government Act 1984) and subservient to the Kabinet in 
other ways but have some autonomy. Customary authority of unimane endures alongside. A 
factor that both contributes to this endurance and is a consequence of it is that many young 
people, particularly women, have migrated to Tarawa to get beyond some of it, as it is less 
pronounced there. 
Accounting in Supply to I-Kiribati  
By the 1930s, I-Kiribati had experienced a century of increasing access to imported trade 
goods (e.g. basic groceries and provisions, metal goods, cloth and tobacco). They had been 
able to pay for these with copra and cash remitted by utu working elsewhere as miners, 
seamen, plantation workers and so on. The goods they traded had been imported and 
distributed as a reciprocal of the collection and export of copra. Facilitating this exchange had 
been the trading companies, their agents and own account traders (see above). For a series of 
reasons culminating in prices of copra and other pacific commodities collapsing c.1930, the 
circumstances and effectiveness of resident traders declined and most companies that they 
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relied on had pulled out or gone under. Only two remained, namely Burns-Philp and On 
Chong (who would soon be bought out by W. R. Carpenter and Co.), and they were 
collaborating rather than competing over prices, and so giving rise to a “commercial system 
of virtual monopoly” (Maude, 1949, p. 7). Despite the fall in I-Kiribati purchasing power 
consequent on the fall in copra prices, the situation called for something different for external 
supply of goods to continue. Thus came about conditions in which the establishment of 
boboti was possible.  
The initial application of this idea was in the Ellice Islands in 1926, under schoolmaster 
turned district officer, Donald Kennedy, although the idea was also in use in other colonies 
(e.g. Tanganyika). Greatly impressed by its success, Southern Gilberts District Officer Harry 
Maude introduced it on Beru in 1931 and, by 1934, there were 34 societies of up to 200 
members on 15 of the Gilbert Islands. Soon they were handling virtually all the intra-island 
trade in copra and goods, with Burns-Philp and On Chong/Carpenter handling importing and 
exporting from Tarawa and Butaritari.  
Subject to some variations, boboti were usually governed by an elected committee, on which 
unimane became prominent. A general meeting of members was held at least every six 
months at which various decisions were voted on, and the books and physical items were 
scrutinised. Thus, they entailed an extension of the enduring principles of mwaneaba 
governance of sharing the process of decision-making among the people, which appealed to 
I-Kiribati, particularly in the southern Gilberts. Other appealing factors identified by 
Macdonald (1982) were that they eliminated profits of private traders of I-Matang and 
Chinese origin or descent. Their prices for goods were calculated by marking up the 
wholesale price by 10%; and the trade-in price for copra was calculated by deducting 10 
shillings per ton from the export price[37]. The resulting contributions were applied to 
expenses: they usually employed only one paid official, called a scribe (later manager). 
Among his general managerial and administrative duties, he kept the account books. These 
comprised separate books to record membership, copra, cash and stores (or stock or 
kaako/cargo); and a pass book for each member to record each transaction with a member. 
Any surpluses were usually applied as retained capital but sometimes they were used to 
provide annual cash bonuses to consumers in proportion to the value of transactions shown in 
their pass books (Macdonald, 1971; Maude, 1949). 
The success of boboti in the 1930s was despite some trying circumstances outlined by Maude 
(1949), most serious being the worsening prices of copra. However, Roniti (1985) indicates 
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that failure would not be allowed to occur because it would entail kamama (i.e. shame) on the 
members. Then they received a financial boost when demand for copra rose and prices 
increased following the outbreak of war in Europe. But this was short-lived because the war 
spread to the Pacific c. 1941, and shipping and trade in the region came to an abrupt halt. Left 
marooned, they soon collapsed and virtually disappeared without trace. However, Maude 
included them in the GEIC rehabilitation plan (GEIC, 1946) along with the GEIC 
Government Trade Scheme, on grounds of efficiency and to avoid the pre-war private 
duopoly. The GEIC Government’s power to do this stemmed from ships being in short 
supply and under control of the Allies, who could thus determine the structure that trade in 
the Pacific would follow[38]. This part of the plan was implemented more swiftly than any 
other, such that by 1948, they had re-opened channels for goods to be imported through 
Tarawa and distributed to island boboti, where they were bought by I-Kiribati. Payment for 
goods was made in copra mostly, whose flow to Tarawa for export was thus resumed, helping 
greatly to restore governmental and church revenues. An extenuating circumstance was the 
post-war world shortage of oils and fats, giving rise to high copra prices, to which I-Kiribati 
responded by increasing production. Indeed, for 10 years up to the late 1950s, a market for 
this copra was guaranteed under a so-called bulk-purchase agreement with the British 
Government’s Ministry of Food[39]. Meanwhile, the mark up on goods and trade in price 
paid for copra were increased while copra prices were good (Macdonald, 1982; Maude, 
1949). 
Maude (1949) alludes to some fundamental differences between these boboti and those of the 
1930s. The 1930s ones emerged locally, albeit with district officer championing and 
encouragement, and were capitalised by I-Kiribati. In contrast, the post-war ones were 
largely initiated by the GEIC Government, which provided administrative and training 
assistance, and mostly took over island stores set up c. 1946 as branches of the Trade 
Scheme. They were largely capitalised within the Trade Scheme, capital being subscribed in 
the form of goods on credit; and came to be overseen by I-Matang officials through 
registration, regulation and audit, eventually provided for through the Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance 1952. A registrar was appointed on Tarawa, and district ones for the Gilberts and 
other districts. Registrars had authority to approve annual estimates, distributions of profits 
and appointments of boboti managers. Rules of thumb built up over the previous two decades 
were formalised in the Ordinance and others introduced, some inspired from the Colonial 
Office and other colonies. These included requirements to draw up rules and have them 
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approved by the registrar, and to be open to inspection and have their books audited by the 
GEIC Government’s Co-operative Division. There was a strict prohibition (eventually 
rescinded) on buying and selling on credit, notwithstanding that in the late 1940s boboti had 
in effect been financed by obtaining stock on credit from the Trade Scheme (Macdonald, 
1971, 1982; Maude, 1949; Roniti, 1985).  
Boboti proved effective until the 1980s. However, in contrast to Macdonald’s (1982) view of 
their success stemming from autonomy, Roniti (1985) argues that the statutory powers, 
oversight by registrars and financial provisions meant that in similar fashion to I-Kiribati 
Governments, they came to be regarded as extensions of the GEIC Government and an 
increasing dislike and distrust of them grew among I-Kiribati. One response was to establish 
mronron, which were beyond the statutory powers and supervisory arrangements applying to 
boboti. From the 1980s, boboti on Tarawa went into decline from the 1980s, with problems 
of governance, management, finance and utilising prime sites evident to me in 1998; and their 
fortunes there had repercussions for ones on Outer Islands. Besides, with the sustained 
permanent migration to Tarawa since the 1970s, and mine working jobs on Banaba and 
Nauru having dried up, cash incomes are lower on these islands now than probably for over 
half a century. 
Elaborating on mronron, these were established at kawa level and among church 
congregations and until quite recently were bound to obtain their supplies from boboti, 
although the two were often competing with each other. As well as being regarded as 
belonging to their I-Kiribati members more so than boboti, another attraction was that they 
dealt in the smallest quantities of basic goods at virtually all hours, and received savings and 
provided small short-term loans. They have gone from strength to strength since the 1960s, 
particularly on Tarawa, where by far the greatest number of business entities are micro-
businesses (e.g. provisions’ kiosks, moneylenders, hawkers of fish, garden produce and 
lunchtime take-aways, buses, bars), and many are mronron. This form of entity is preferred as 
it circumvents continuing customary restrictions that would bring community censure and 
ridicule on individuals who trade for self-seeking reasons and ambition, or adopt other I-
Matang ways. Notwithstanding, there are micro-businesses that are family owned and 
operated but even these are at pains to stress their community service nature (Macdonald, 
1982; Roniti, 1985).  
Accounting practices in micro-businesses revolve around basic financial administration and 
making basic operating decisions rudimentary forms of operating controls and makeshift 
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accounting records to facilitate. In provisions businesses run out of roadside kiosks, I saw 
every sale being listed in an exercise book and at intervals the total in the book being 
reconciled with the cash. They may well reflect the practices of I-Matang trading among I-
Kiribati a century or so ago and in boboti, with some reinforcement from the bookkeeping 
education and training that is provided in schools, etc. (see Dixon, 2004b). There seems to be 
an amount of overkill and ritual compliance with what similar businesses are seen do and 
with meanings taken from trying to make sense of I-Matang bookkeeping textbooks[40]. 
Notwithstanding the record keeping, the notion of separating a business from its owners, á la 
the business entity concept, is not widely appreciated, and so I-Kiribati trying to run a trade 
store or similar find their utu being unable to grasp the distinction between goods forming the 
capital of a business and goods available to consume domestically. A parallel problem of 
sustainability is that some proprietors find difficulty in distinguishing between funds required 
to replenish stock or pay invoices for items bought on credit and funds representing profits.  
An example of accounting being used somewhat unwittingly to discriminate and 
disadvantage I-Kiribati that I perceived in 1998 was that the sole commercial bank’s criteria 
for making advances were based on first-world accounting practices. In any case, many micro 
businesses tend not to use bank accounts[41], and so were being denied access to credit. 
Critically, most of the bank’s domestic advances were overdrafts and short term loans, and 
more than 80% of deposits were invested in overseas securities. Advances on more 
development-based criteria were available from the development bank, to which micro-
businesses and personal borrowers were turning. 
Regressing to the 1940s, the Trade Scheme was a separate accounting entity from the GEIC 
Government, financed by loan capital from the British Treasury and grants from the CDWF. 
However, at first, it was run in a cumbersome bureaucratic manner by I-Matang officials as 
another part of the GEIC Government. When this was realised as being unsatisfactory, it was 
injected with I-Matang commercial expertise and Morris, Hedstrom Ltd, of Suva, Sydney and 
London were appointed as its overseas purchasing agents. As alluded to above, it set up 
stores on most islands, which were then handed over to boboti that I-Kiribati had been 
encouraged to form (Maude, 1949). By 1955, it had repaid the aforementioned loan capital, 
and was then transformed into the Wholesale Society, financed from capital contributed from 
Trade Scheme surpluses and by boboti. 
An interesting extension of the Trade Scheme was the Producers’ Development and 
Stabilization Fund, established from some of its profits (Maude, 1949). It was the first of 
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various income equalisation and subsidy schemes implemented by the GEIC and Republic 
Governments to counter the effects of world price fluctuations on I-Kiribati access to trade 
goods. Notwithstanding, income from copra fell during the 1960s, and so cash remittances 
from Banaba and Nauru overtook copra as the main form of spending in boboti, with copra 
accounting for as little as 20% of purchases on drier islands. In the early 1970s, in a more 
buoyant market, the GEIC Government provided subsidies to copra cutters to encourage co-
operative development of smallholdings and improvement of trees, and a short-lived rise in 
world prices motivated I-Kiribati to increase harvesting for a while (Macdonald, 1982). 
Since, world prices have been on a downward trend and the prognosis is for this to continue. 
The export of copra continues to be vested in a governmental body, the aforementioned 
marketing board. For some years, the prices it pays to copra cutters through islands’ boboti 
have been significantly above the falling world market price, and this has been portrayed as 
equalisation of prices over a trade cycle, or stabilisation of prices in the face of fluctuating 
ones. The prices to I-Kiribati are achieved with assistance through the European Union’s 
Stabilisation des recettes d'Exportation (STABEX) (Aiello, 1999). In addition, the copra is 
transported to Tarawa by the government-owned inter-island shipping service, which is 
subsidised from general Republic Government revenues. As significant sources of these are 
fishing licence fees and investment income from the RERF, this latter subsidy has the 
fortuitous effect of distributing among the people of the Outer Islands a little of the past and 
present windfall gains from phosphate mining and tuna fishing. The continuation of these 
arrangements may be under threat because the Republic Government is being pressed by 
international financial institutions to abolish these so-called agricultural subsidies because 
they appear contrary to the free market dogma underlying their neo-liberal policies. 
Notwithstanding, the Republic Government recently established a processing plant to 
produce local soap and oil on Tarawa under the auspices of the Kiribati Copra Mill Co. Ltd, a 
government-owned limited company capitalised through an aid project, and this now takes 
some copra instead of it all going for export. 
The Kiribati Copra Mill Co. Ltd is the latest in a series of enterprises the GEIC and then 
Republic Governments have gotten involved in, the first having been the Trade Scheme. Not 
only have these suited local circumstances but they were in keeping with a change in general 
philosophy and policy made by the British Government about modernising its colonies, 
including governmental intervention in their economic development (Morgan, 1980). Various 
reasons encouraged and necessitated the GEIC and then Republic Governments in further 
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similar ventures to the Trade Scheme. First was the apparent success of the Trade Scheme. 
Second were the increasing needs of the GEIC Government stemming from modernisation 
and of the growing numbers of I-Matang, Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati residing on Tarawa as a 
consequence; these outstripped what boboti had the capital or expertise to do. Third was the 
seeming lack of interest in the GEIC from external private companies because of its lack of 
profit potential.  
How these ventures came about included that in the 1950s and 1960s, various GEIC 
Government departments began engaging in activities (e.g. minor public works, maintenance 
of construction, vehicle and plant, import of supplies, ship building and repairs) as an adjunct 
to their primary functions. The bureaucratic ways these were organised, the lack of awareness 
of costs of particular activities and these costs falling on general revenues, and concerns 
about their inefficiency led in the early 1970s to all of these activities being brought under a 
new umbrella organisation, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Development Authority (GEIDA), 
and put on a more economic footing. The GEIDA also embraced the Wholesale Society, 
which despite its partial ownership by boboti was seen by I-Kiribati as an agency of the 
GEIC Government and was managed by I-Matang staff. The GEIDA was also intended to 
oversee development activities, reflecting similar bodies in other colonies (e.g. Northern 
Nigerian Development Company, Uganda Development Corporation, Cameroons 
Development Corporation (Morgan, 1980). However, the GEIDA was a short-lived entity, 
proving to be an inefficient, monopolistic and “an all-consuming monster” (Macdonald, 
1982, p. 183), and so it was dismantled and its activities re-assigned in the late 1970s.  
Said activities were dispersed among several separate governmental bodies, although 
formally the Kiribati Co-operative Wholesale Society (KCWS) was owned by the various 
boboti. The fate of these bodies has been to give rise to many of the corporate public 
enterprises and joint ventures of today, to which new activities and ventures have been added 
since. This includes the KCWS, which became insolvent by the early 1990s and was taken 
over by a governmental enterprise, Bobotin Kiribati Ltd. Over 20 were gradually transformed 
into government-owned businesses incorporated under the Companies Ordinance 1979, and 
up to 10 comprise statutory organisations (e.g. Public Utilities Board, Kiribati Housing 
Corporation) (see ADB, 2002, for a recent list). Some were or continue as joint ventures 
between the Republic Government and Pacific-region transnational companies, with the latter 
supplying not only capital but also I-Matang senior management expertise (e.g. the 
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Australian and New Zealand (ANZ) Banking Group’s participation in the Bank of Kiribati, 
the country’s sole commercial bank – see http://www.anz.com/kiribati/).  
Under their neo-liberal policies, and structural adjustment programme, international financial 
institutions would like the Republic Government to privatise the enterprises it owns (IMF, 
1999) but this has not happened for various reasons, including lack of political will and 
popular support; lack of private capital; and a perception that these so-called businesses are 
not about making profits and providing vehicles for economic investment, but are there to 
maintain an inflow of trade goods, provide utilities and commercial services, and, somewhat 
incidentally now, enable the outflow of copra (Dixon, 2004a). However, the liberalising of 
official and cultural attitudes to trade has been a contributory factor in the emergence 
alongside government enterprises of an increasing but still small number of individually 
significant private for-profit businesses[42] over the past two decades: the primary factor has 
been the population and economic growth of Tarawa. These businesses are local initiatives, 
mostly from two sources: I-Matang who arrived in Kiribati since the 1970s as contract staff 
of the government, aid agencies and joint venture companies and have turned into latter-day 
traders; and descendants of I-Matang and Chinese traders of the 1850s to 1930s era whose 
families have tended to be involved in commerce in some way over the years, including for 
the government and boboti. The legal statuses of these businesses vary between limited 
companies and business partnerships[43]. Along with government businesses, they are 
important in supplying the needs of the populace on Tarawa, displacing the three or four 
boboti once ascendant there, but are less so on Outer Islands, where boboti have only recently 
been joined by a few government business.  
Regarding accounting in government enterprises and these private businesses, most seem to 
employ I-Kiribati accounting specialists, with undergraduate diploma and degree 
qualifications perhaps (Dixon. 2004b). At least in government businesses, these finance 
managers are usually members of appointed boards of directors that govern the businesses, or 
are advisors at board meetings. The language of accounting is English, as reflected still in 
most official and formal business papers (e.g. legislation government documents, accounts 
and budgets, consultants reports commissioned by international financial institutions, papers 
and accounts of the larger businesses), with relatively few being translated into te taetae ni 
Kiribati. Most systems are concerned with the administration and control of ordering, 
stocking, selling and distributing goods, collecting money and paying bills. They have 
increased in sophistication as the cash economy has grown and as computer technology has 
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become accessible, although paper-based systems are still common. Indeed, those that 
emerged via the GEIDA probably are burdened even now with its somewhat over-elaborate 
paper-based operating information and internal controls. From what I observed in 1997-99, 
they tend to dictate how things are done, including how slowly customers are dealt with. As 
in government ministries, there is a tendency for I-Kiribati staff, particularly in government 
businesses, to adhere to procedures ritualistically. Few staff are attuned to systems signalling 
“problems” or helping make commercial choices. An extension of this is that the pricing of 
goods continues to follow the pattern established by boboti, with a standard and quite low 
mark up, and little adjustment either to curb demand in response to shortages or to stimulate 
demand for items failing to sell, including, more obviously, foodstuffs with limited shelf 
lives. Moreover, government price controls dating from a few decades ago apply to items 
regarded as necessities (e.g. rice, tobacco, kerosene and school exercise books). 
Regarding accounting for government enterprises and private businesses incorporated under 
the Companies Ordinance 1979, its accounting and related requirements are typical for a 
former colony in reflecting similar British legislation of the 1940s and 1960s (see Walton, 
1986). Company directors file annual accounting returns, among other documents, with the 
companies’ registrar, and these are open to public searches. The large sample of returns I 
perused in 1997 comprised a directors’ report, profit and loss statement, balance sheet, and a 
report of the auditor, if one had been appointed. A cash flow statement was sometimes 
volunteered. The return formats varied among companies but seemed consistent for each 
company, although a change of accountant could lead to a change in format. Fines were 
levied on companies that failed to submit timely annual returns and most were remarkably 
prompt. However, as well as being disadvantaged because the accounts are in English framed 
in I-Matang concepts of economics and business (e.g. periodicity, entity recognition, using 
money as a unit of measurement and maintaining money capital) and are concerned with 
measurement of economic transactions and performance, it is doubtful whether many I-
Kiribati appreciate their rights to information from the registrar within the general principle 
of institutions, particularly I-Matang-inspired ones, being accountable to them. 
In addition to complying with the Companies Ordinance 1979, government companies, along 
with statutory boards, are required to submit audited accounting statements to Te Mwaneaba 
ni Maungatabu, the audits being performed by the KNAO. This seems to be of greater public 
significance among I-Kiribati than reporting under the Companies Ordinance, deriving partly 
from proceedings of Te Mwaneaba being broadcast live on Radio Kiribati, with repeat 
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broadcasts in the evenings and during recesses. This public spectacle and the interest shown 
in it reminded me of similar public interest in formal mwaneaba discussions among unimane 
on Nikunau, and as reported by Kazama (2001) on Tabiteuea South. Regarding the scope of 
audits, in the late 1990s, the I-Kiribati Auditor-General encouraged compliance with 
standards of reporting issued by the International Federation of Accountants. His reports 
included not only true-and-fair-view opinions but also financial performance analyses. He 
criticised many enterprises for overstocking, inadequate controls on credit sales, failing to 
perform regular bank reconciliations and other internal control matters. Questions in Te 
Mwaneaba stimulated changes of governance structures and senior managers. However, this 
put the Auditor-General under some pressure not only because those subjected to kamama 
had relatives in high government positions but also because someone monitoring, controlling, 
evaluating and subjecting other I-Kiribati to kamama brings kamama on himself.  
Accounting to Facilitate Colonial and International Aid 
I have referred already to the global expansion of the aid industry, that successive Republic 
Governments have been persuaded to accept guidance, influence, advice and capital 
donations, and that this has had repercussions for government accounting. Given its size and 
scope, the aid industry in Kiribati constitutes a significant and varied area of accounting 
separate from but interrelated with government. It involves both I-Kiribati and I-Matang and 
other outsiders (e.g. Japanese, Chinese of both hues) but with the latter ascendant through not 
only holding the purse strings but also in terms of knowledge and skills associated with the 
subjects of projects and with project processes and accounting for projects.  
This started during the modernising agenda of the GEIC Government of the 1940s to the 
1970s. It was increasingly implemented on a project basis and financed with specific capital 
grants after the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 onwards were adopted by 
the British Government. These projects had to be justified by the GEIC Government to the 
High Commission in Honiara and to London. Aid was mostly in cash and individual project 
accounts were increasingly in evidence in the GEIC Government systems. However, there 
were restrictions on where cash could be spent, for example on goods and services sourced 
from Britain in preference to elsewhere (Macdonald, 1982). As grants by and large were from 
the same Colonial Office source, so the accounting format requirements only varied over 
time.  
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This changed after Independence and a wide range of donors emerged, each with their own 
accounting requirements, which also have varied over time (Burall, Maxwell and Menocal, 
2006; Hove, 1986). As indicated above, the understandable inability of I-Kiribati government 
accountants to cope and a preference anyway among some donors to provide aid-in-kind has 
resulted in a decreasing proportion of the cash associated with the aggregate of donations 
being handled by the Republic Government, and an increasing proportion handled by and 
accounted for along with expenditures etc. by the agencies themselves, sometimes in Kiribati 
but mainly elsewhere, with the reporting invariably aimed there and rarely to I-Kiribati. I 
observed in the late 1990s that in the formulating and planning stages of projects, 
consultants’ reports often contained an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
recommendations, which were measured using first-world accounting criteria, together with 
specific ideas about financial management and control, if the recommendations ran to 
creating institutions or systems and the consultant appreciated the accounting implications. 
As Rondinelli (1993) reports elsewhere, considerations of benefit-cost and financial control 
were prominent in subsequent project appraisal processes used by most donors, at least as 
legitimising tools. In their implementation stages, even with accounting and reporting all 
done abroad, projects sometimes entailed accounting and performance reporting systems 
being instituted in Kiribati, and so with I-Kiribati subject to and possibly participating in the 
accounting in order that projects and personnel could be monitored and evaluated, and for 
reports up chains of command stretching to the Global North. Systems included use of 
qualitative and quantitative data, financial and non-financial, processed into statements of 
objectives, logical frames, aid-worker personal performance reports, project progress reports, 
etc. Aid-in-cash raised more involved accounting and control issues. For example, some 
branches of foreign NGOs were raising overseas funding from multiple donors on a project-
by-project basis. In similar fashion to the Republic Government as alluded to above, their 
usually I-Matang general managers were obliged to keep separate accounting records, and 
separate bank accounts even, for each donor and mostly for each project, and to comply with 
donors’ increasingly elaborate and varying reporting requirements, despite lacking funding to 
employ specialist accountants.  
As regards the accounting technology content of projects that entail establishing or re-
establishing (usually labelled “strengthening”) organisations, project staff usually perceived 
this content as an essential but incidental ingredient in most such projects, for which 
invariably the aim (sometimes forlorn) of sustainability without further external 
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implementing agency assistance and funding was espoused, as reported occurring elsewhere 
(Burt and Clerk, 1997; Rondinelli, 1993). For example, the project I worked on aimed to 
strengthen a further education institution that was established by I-Matang in the days of the 
GEIC. As its financial and other administrative structures and processes had virtually ceased 
to function in the eyes of I-Matang project staff, they had to facilitate the setting up of new 
ones by managerial, teaching, clerical and financial staff as part of the project outputs, in the 
expectation that the latter would assume responsibility for performing budgeting, budgetary 
control, internal control, costing, and resource allocation and attraction functions.  
Discussion 
The genealogy of accounting I presented in Figure 1 and the bloodlines I have elaborated 
above constitute the main contributions of this paper. However, it would not be complete 
without some discussion of implications. Below I address the three areas signalled in the 
introduction, acknowledging that lots more choices would have been possible. Before that, 
however, it is appropriate to comment on the nature of the findings that are implicit in the 
above analytical description. At one level the analysis merely provides another example to 
confirm what other writers (e.g. Wallace and Briston, 1993) have described as the non-
formalised channels through which accounting has moved from the Global North to the 
Global South, and the external-supply-push nature of the flows along these channels, except 
that push is not a suitable metaphor. That is, most of the accounting passing along these 
channels was accompanying baggage of I-Matang and intended for their use and in their 
interests, not recipients already in situ at the end of the channel. However, at another level the 
analysis illuminates one example of how the accounting that has been carried through these 
channels has been figuring longitudinally in the knowledge and power relations and processes 
between various types of people who have felt the need to create and operate the channels 
and the people at the outflow end. 
Transparency and Accountability in Economic Growth and Social Well-being 
Regarding the extent that experience might have equipped I-Kiribati citizens of the republic 
with knowledge and power to apply accounting in ways consistent with transparency and 
accountability espousals of the international financial institutions specific to Kiribati (e.g. 
ADB, 2002), there is little evidence to suggest that the accounting information, the 
accounting control or similar were ever originally intended to empower I-Kiribati, except 
those prepared to work in partnership with (as the junior partner) or be lulled into 
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collaborating with I-Matang in order to civilise/control, convert in religious belief, 
modernise, liberalise or other change their fellow I-Kiribati. For example, it was never in the 
nature of colonial administrations or other arms of the British Government (e.g. the BPC) to 
be accountable to I-Kiribati. I-Kiribati were often seen as inferior beings to be patronised, 
subdued, controlled and exploited. For most of the time since accounting practices were 
introduced, I-Kiribati were never the intended recipients of accounting reports and other 
outputs, either in managerial and governance roles or as the public. Before independence, 
even though various reports and accounts found their way into the public records, the closest 
most records approached the inhabitants of the various islands was at GEIC Government 
headquarters at Bairiki on Tarawa, and many were overseas. The records were part of I-
Matang institutions that I-Kiribati still have difficulty accessing (e.g. the national library and 
archives). Meanwhile, administrations owed accountability elsewhere, to governments back 
home. The I-Kiribati were not included much in accounting systems determination of 
purpose, development or maintenance or in use of accounting information; and transparency 
was never part of the purpose of the systems. So, why should they be expected to embrace the 
latter let alone re-develop systems consistent with it as a prime purpose? 
The underlying theories and language of accounting puts most I-Kiribati at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis a small number of I-Kiribati, thus empowering people based on intellect with 
expertise in the area at the expense of those of a certain age. Thus, this technology is not 
increasing the transparency of government institutions and influential private sector 
organisations, and so is not making the people’s representatives on the governing bodies of 
these organisations any more publicly accountable than they already are from the informal, 
conversational data that citizens hear and on which they can base judgments. Indeed, instead 
of making things transparent, and empowering accountees, accounting at least hampers and 
sometimes disqualifies I-Kiribati from participating in some structures and processes of 
institutions inherited from I-Matang and through which much power is now exercised, while 
legitimising the authority of the people it is supposed to be making accountable. In particular, 
the foreign concept of a sovereign nation state comprising all islands is propped up in part by 
accounting ideas, processes and systems.  However, having been marginalised by 
modernisation on Tarawa and the migration this has stimulated, it could be said that as far as 
I-Kiribati on many Outer Islands are concerned the part played in daily life by central 
government and other bodies on Tarawa has diminished, possibly to a level not experienced 
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for a century, and there are no longer any I-Matang and Samoans in the guise of churchmen, 
notwithstanding that church activities, including fund raising, are ubiquitous. 
The accountability and power that these ideas, processes and systems is facilitating in some I-
Kiribati is competing with something akin to accountability that is part of the I-Kiribati 
culture. This runs along individual and family lines, concerns moral, cultural and social 
matters, as well as economic ones, that are of no more than equal and perhaps less 
importance. Macdonald (1982) opined that beneath the constitutional independence, the 
trappings of government as expected by I-Matang agencies operating on Tarawa and to a 
much lesser extent elsewhere, and the benefits, etc, of trade and other interaction with the 
modern outside world, there is still something immutable about te I-Kiribati’s ties to his or 
her utu and aba and identification with the island where the latter and some of the former, 
alive or dead, are still to be found. That participants in formal organisations owe 
accountability individually or collectively to others (e.g. line managers, customers, 
stakeholders), and conversely, that someone or a group of people can expect others to be 
accountable to them in a Global North managerial or stakeholder sense, are both alien ideas, 
as is the idea of disseminating information that is not explicitly solicited. Add to this cocktail 
the reticence that I-Kiribati have about monitoring and holding each other to account, which 
applies doubly to their elders, then conventional theories about accounting serving 
stakeholders fall down; and the same applies to internal control and accountability within 
organisations.  
Triumph of Hope over Experience 
Regarding the triumph of hope over experience, there is plenty of evidence in the period since 
modernisation came into vogue to suggest ideas are implemented repeatedly and give rise 
repeatedly to outcomes that have been disappointing seen from the I-Matang point of view of 
I-Kiribati as the intended beneficiaries, and so disappointing to those I-Matang with 
expectations of benefit. An example relates to technology introduced through projects. 
Starting the description of the typical cycle when I-Kiribati take over some first-world, state-
of-the-art technology installed by the just departed I-Matang experts, although sometimes the 
technology just disappears, as other authors report elsewhere (e.g. Wallace and Briston, 
1993), in many cases the fabric of the technology is sustained. However, signals the 
technology broadcasts are frequently ignored, limited use is made of whatever the technology 
produces, intended chains of accountability or whatever have little effect, and instead 
ritualistic adherence to procedures displaces the spirit and purpose (economic, political and/or 
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social) that its I-Matang architects intended, not least because these lack cultural legitimacy, 
are ill-suited to the environment, the learning curve is too steep (including because they have 
not experienced how the new technology might have evolved from the old because the 
evolution occurred elsewhere, and they are unlikely to be able to turn to other I-Kiribati 
operating the same technology elsewhere on Tarawa., etc., even if that was culturally 
acceptable, which it is not). These rituals may symbolise contribution to the work of kawa-
like organisations, not to mention providing ways of passing time during office hours, 
although they also allow upper- and middle-level staff to exercise knowledge and power. As 
with many other technologies (e.g. education curricula, water and sewerage systems, 
operations involving computers, electronic equipment, plant, vehicles and machinery), rarely 
are there enough I-Kiribati able to perform repair and maintenance tasks associated with 
accounting practices (and even if there are, any necessary parts may be unobtainable), and so 
the rituals are interrupted by technical breakdowns. After several years have passed, new I-
Matang arrive to espy said technology as a problem. They have little time or inclination to 
study the history of the technology and they know that, in any case, aid donors do not want to 
get involved in “non-prestigious” projects, such as ones to repair existing technology to 
sustain basic services (Traynor and Watts, 1992); and so they champion and implement a 
project involving state-of-the-art technology as the solution, perhaps naively believing in, or 
paying lip service to, the idea of sustaining their new technology. If the technology 
materialises, then once I-Matang hand it on to I-Kiribati to operate, the cycle is repeated. 
This pattern applies to many other technologies besides accounting (e.g. education curricula, 
water and sewerage systems, plant, vehicles and machinery, and anything involving 
computers or electronic equipment).  
Neo-Colonialism 
Regarding neo-colonialism, no matter if this intended or otherwise, I-Kiribati do not seem to 
have been as politically and economically independent as might have been supposed at 
various times but particularly following the institution of the republic in 1979 when they 
allegedly attained Independence. More so than the underlying theories and language of 
accounting putting most I-Kiribati at a disadvantage vis-à-vis a small number of I-Kiribati, 
they put all I-Kiribati at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the staff of international financial 
institutions, aid donors and similar organisations. Accounting ideas, processes and systems 
maintain secrets, which mostly are only discernable by I-Matang with particular knowledge 
and expertise. This is in keeping with accounting as applied by present-day I-Matang being 
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likely to amount to I-Kiribati (continuing to be) being accounted about (rather than to) as part 
of a structural adjustment programme, an idea that Jacobs (2000) reviewed in relation to 
Maori in New Zealand. This allows I-Matang in question to exercise knowledge and power 
over said citizens in ways that amount to neo-colonialism, with instead of accounting figuring 
in the lives of I-Kiribati, both locally and at a distance, be it from a district headquarters, the 
Residency, the High Commission or London, it is now figuring from Manila, Canberra, 
Wellington, Tokyo, Brussels, and Washington (and more besides no doubt). Political 
independence notwithstanding, accounting used by and championed through aid-granting 
institutions and international organisations is increasingly dominant, born of advances in 
accounting practices, surfeits of ideas, enthusiastic personnel and finance for “development”, 
and impatience for change. However, I-Kiribati seem to have a remarkable knack of 
absorbing the plans of religiously-minded and governmentally-minded I-Matang, by adopting 
outward I-Matang forms but retaining the substance of I-Kiribati culture (Macdonald, 1982).  
Conclusions and Further Research 
My paper was prompted by arguments expressed by an IMF official about transparency and 
accountability and how these contribute to social stability and economic growth. Taking the 
Republic of Kiribati as a site to study, and believing that transparency and accountability rely 
to some extent on accounting, I delved into accounting as it has figured in the Republic. I 
found that various people had used accounting at various times and that many of these uses 
contributed to its use today. I synthesised my basic findings into a genealogy comprised of 
various bloodlines and then delved further into these. The bulk of my paper comprises the 
genealogy and elaborations of each bloodline. I then used this new found knowledge to 
conduct brief discussions around three things: ideas of public bodies being transparent and 
this transparency giving rise to accountability to I-Kiribati, with consequences that that 
process might have; the idea of the triumph of hope over experience; and the possibility, 
intended or otherwise, of neo-colonialism being effected through accounting. I conclude that 
notions of transparency and accountability are mere rhetoric in English, and barely 
intelligible to people who speak and whole culture is reflected in te taetae ni Kiribati. There 
is plenty of evidence of the triumph of hope over experience, and much of this is less because 
of ignorance than of complex personal and institutional motives at odds with espousals of 
aiding a developing people. Intended or otherwise, neo-colonialism is rife, but is probably no 
more effective than under the previous explicit British variety.  
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Further research could be conducted elsewhere using the methods in this study: accounting in 
very few parts of the world or their peoples can be said to have been studied longitudinally, 
except in mainly English speaking countries where research is prolific. In Kiribati, I am 
already looking at the consequences of the accounting analysed in this paper for particular I-
Kiribati (see Dixon, 2007b). 
 
 
Notes 
1 Having white skins, aboriginal Europeans were thought by I-Kiribati in early encounters to come from the 
land of Matang, the land of white people, whence originated the first bakatibu (i.e. ancestors beyond the seventh 
generation), Te I-Matang, and to where the souls of the dead are believed to return (Grimble, 1952; Sabatier, 
1977).  
2 In controversial circumstances, the people of Tuvalu (i.e. Ellice Islanders) elected to form a separate 
Dominion from in 1976 but because of a delay to try to resolve the Banaban problem the Gilbert Islands were 
not decolonised until 1979 (Macdonald, 1982). 
3 The title alludes to assessing the likely performance on the racecourse of thoroughbred racehorses by 
reference to the corresponding performances of their forebears and other near relations. This is particularly 
significant in pairing horses to breed from, and when a horse is a foal or a yearling (i.e. when it is likely to be 
put up for sale and many months before it is mature enough to gallop and race).  
4 Arthur Grimble was from a well-to-do family that amassed a moderate fortune in Hong Kong. Educated at 
Cambridge, he also spent some time studying languages in Europe before working as a colonial official in the 
GEIC for almost 20 years from 1914, including as resident commissioner from 1926 to 1932. He then worked in 
other colonies before retiring from the Colonial Service to write and broadcast, notably about the Gilberts, and 
continue to study languages; he was a member of the Royal Anthropological Society (Simon Seligman, personal 
communication). Ernest Sabatier went to the Gilberts as a Roman Catholic priest in 1914 and died there in 1965. 
Harry Maude, also a Cambridge graduate, spent almost 20 years as a colonial official with the GEIC 
Government from 1929, after which he joined the South Pacific Commission and then became an academic. 
Barrie Macdonald is an academic who studied under Maude and carried out field study research during four 
extended visits to the Gilberts between 1969 and 1977.  
5 In his explanation of utu, Maude (1963) points out that in theory a person’s utu is an indefinitely extensible 
category of near and distant kindred, but that in practice it is bounded by knowing with whom one shares a 
common ancestor. Given the still keen knowledge of genealogy among I-Kiribati, this will certainly be scores 
and probably hundreds of people, the common ancestor being possibly several generations back and long dead. 
However, in personal communications, Hegnes Dixon and Dick Overy distinguish between utu and koraki, the 
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former being near kindred sharing a common ancestor say within four or five generations and including relatives 
by marriage, while the latter are more distant blood relatives. 
6 One feature of the language (as demonstrated in te taetae ni Kiribati) is that singular words are distinguished 
from plural ones by being preceded by te. 
7 At the main secondary school (i.e. King George V (KGVS) from the 1920s, and then King George V and 
Elaine Bernacchi School (KGVEBS), when it went co-educational in the 1970s, the students up the 1980s, who 
included my wife, were punished for using te taetae ni Kiribati on campus. 
8 Sabatier reports one old missionary as saying that, “After ten years in the islands you think you know the local 
people; after twenty-five years you doubt it and after forty years you are firmly convinced that you do not know 
them” (1977. p. 341). 
9 Butaritari’s uea system lasted well into the 20th century. Uea systems also displaced the mwaneaba system 
periodically elsewhere, especially from the time of organised trading with I-Matang. For example, Abemama, 
Kuria and Aranuka were ruled by the patriarchal Baiteke and then his son, the infamous despot Binoka, for the 
second half of the 19th century. Thus, in the Native Laws 1894 enacted by the GEIP Government of Resident 
Commissioner  Swayne (1893-95), the nine islands from Aranuka northwards were recognised as having uea; 
and the seven islands southwards from Nonouti were recognised as having mwaneaba councils (Macdonald, 
1971, 1972, 1982).  
10 This arises because relics and other artefacts were housed in them, although each kainga (i.e. hamlets) also 
had a bangota (i.e. shrine) with a stone symbolising an anti (a spirit, possibly of the first human bakatibu of the 
utu). It was adorned regularly and an offering of food left.  
11 Regarding the significances of land, similar traditions apply elsewhere in the Pacific, including among 
Aboriginal Australians, as analysed by Gibson (2000) and Greer and Patel (2000); and NZ Maori, as analysed 
by Kearins and Hooper (2002).  
12 Exceptions stemmed from rewarding acts of kindness; wars, leading to aba belonging to the vanquished 
being shared out (and captured former owners being enslaved); aba being gifted as part of tinaba relationships 
(see Grimble, 1957); and aba forming compensation for breach of promise of marriage, serious wrongdoings 
and similar. The wars were curtailed under the Protectorate; the Christians tried stamping out tinaba 
relationships, but land due for these continued being transferred under other guises; and compensation ended 
when the I-Matang practice of crime and punishment by the state was instituted under the Protectorate 
(Lundsgaarde, 1974; Macdonald, 1982; Sabatier, 1977). 
13 Grimble and Clarke advised that “[S]imple magic rituals and charms are the concomitants of every 
conceivable form of native activity” (1929, p. 6). However, long-established knowledge, skills and technology 
should not be underrated because of the attendant magic and rituals. Such things often go together in other 
societies, as analysed by Abrahamson and Fairchild (1999). 
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14 Disputes arose for various reasons, including disagreements over boundaries, contested ownership arising 
from inheritance and other transfers, and encroachment on seldom used aba being challenged. Courts took the 
form of unimane sitting in mwaneaba, but sometimes fights were arranged between individuals or wars occurred 
between mwaneaba districts. The GEIP/GEIC Governments stamped out combat and, at various times, tried to 
institute land registers and land courts within the GEIC Government judicial structure. The first attempt at a 
register by Campbell was a dismal failure as the premises it was based on were somewhat removed from I-
Kiribati practices of ownership, usage and conveyancing, and later attempts have not fared much better. Land 
courts as instituted under the Native Governments Ordinance 1941 may have increased rather than reduced the 
volume of disputes and the stimulation and distraction they give rise to among I-Kiribati. They provided an 
outlet for unimane to exercise their longitudinal knowledge of aba and their enduring authority (Crocombe, 
1987; Grimble, 1952, 1957; Lundsgaarde, 1974; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982; Maude, 1963; Pole, 1995; 
Sabatier, 1977). 
15 Even today, after considerable social change I-Kiribati can usually recite their utu back for several 
generations, and often do when they meet fellow I-Kiribati they do not know personally, to see how closely 
related they might be. In particular, one of the first things I-Kiribati who might form a sexual attachment do is 
compare their knowledge of ancestry, so as to avoid committing karikira. 
16 Generally, these included births (particularly of first-born children), first “birthdays”, women’s first 
menstruations (now celebrated intermittently), marriages and deaths. On Butaritari, they extended to occasions 
relating to uea and their accessions. 
17 The Line refers to the Equator. 
18 On Tarawa, cash has changed from being regarded as mere transitory wealth to something more substantial. 
However, on Outer Islands, it is rather incidental still to land, physical and knowledge assets, and subsistence 
products. In 1987, in Tabomatang mwaneaba district on Nikunau I was entrusted by te unimane with a sack of 
copra, representing a few days collecting, splitting and drying. He sent me to the island co-operative shop in the 
nearby Nikumanu district, at the back of whose modest premises was a copra store of longstanding, I handed 
over the sack and was given a few coins. I immediately handed these back and rode away clutching a small 
bottle of tomato ketchup manufactured in Australia. 
19 For example, in June 1892, while annexing the GEIP, Captain Davis RN recorded a trader in four of the 
mwaneaba districts on Nikunau, namely Jean François (Frank) Even (own account), Richard Tomlinson (Jaluit 
Geswellschaft), Tom Day (own account) and Robert Homes (Crawford & Co. of San Francisco) (see Resture, 
2004). The latter’s store was probably at Nikumanu, and if so Andrew Turner took it over shortly after. Kain 
Nikunau (people of Nikunau) in the other two districts used the store in the neighbouring district (e.g. see note 
20), with a certain reluctance because of an underlying rivalry between districts. 
20 Three brothers who came to the Gilberts were seeking refuge from the Sino-Japanese war of, probably, 1894-
95. They took up trading on three islands under assumed names, married locally and gave rise to the Kum Kee 
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family, which is prominent in several Tarawa businesses today (personal communication from Buaua Willis-
Richards, granddaughter of one brother). 
21 There was no local financial institution in the Gilberts until sometime in to the GEIC period, and even then it 
was created to facilitate governmental and personal money transfers rather than as a bank for commercial 
undertakings. The first commercial trading bank was not established until 1970 (Macdonald, 1982). 
22 Murdoch arrived in the Gilberts as a young man c. 1870 and died there 60 years later. He put the literacy, 
numeracy, bookkeeping and storekeeping that Corrie taught him to good use. After working for Corrie and then 
trading on his own, he became trading master to Binoka, taking over from a series of relatives of that uea. 
Following Binoka’s death in 1891 he was involved in an ill-fated venture to Guatemala with I-Kiribati 
labourers, and then became a GEIP government agent, interpreter and tax collector in the central and southern 
Gilberts districts, including a spell as acting resident commissioner during 1912. He mentored the young Arthur 
Grimble c.1914. His two marriages produced an abundance of offspring (Horwood, 1994), many of whose 
descendants are involved in present-day government and trade.  
23 I-Kiribati were sometimes exploited as labourers elsewhere (including as victims of blackbirding and as 
indentured labourers), although they also obtained financial and other benefits in the same capacity, giving rise 
to a substantial flow of remittances. Among work done was on whaling and trading ships, not just locally but as 
far as Europe, the West Indies and the Cape Colony; and on copra, sugar and coffee plantations and in mines 
around the Pacific (e.g. Fiji, Guatemala, Hawaii, Line Islands, Mexico, Queensland, Samoa, Tahiti, Nauru, 
Banaba) (Macdonald, 1982; Maude, 1968, 1977b; Sabatier, 1977).  
24 An informal survey of several I-Kiribati aged between 25 and 45 revealed little awareness of not only the 
name of their boti but of the general concept. Further inquiry of some of their elderly parents revealed some 
awareness of the concept and of names of parent’s boti.  
25 The extension of the wares of traders to cloth, and of local skills to making clothes, arose because of the 
missions’ aversion to nakedness. Obliging I-Kiribati to wear clothes also led to such afflictions as tuberculosis 
and skin disease. 
26 After his 1892 visit to Nikunau, Captain Davis reported there being up to 200 police among a population of 
barely 2,000 (Resture, 2004). 
27 The Hawaiians were part of the Boston-based American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
(ABCFM) and the Hawaiian Evangelical Association, which sponsored the Protestant missions in the northern 
Gilberts until c. 1917, when they withdrew in favour of the LMS. 
28 Barely 3,000 people (<10% of the population of the GEIC) lived on Tarawa atoll before the short-lived 
Japanese occupation. There were 6,000 (<15%) in 1963, 10,000 (>20%) in 1968, and nearly 15,000 (>28%) in 
1973. Shortly after Independence, when many Tuvaluans and some I-Matang left, the population was just over 
15,000 (>25% of the population of Kiribati) whereas now it is over 45,000 (>48%) (Government of Kiribati, 
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2007; Macdonald, 1982). 
29 A related idea is that of work or other matters being “for the Government”. This derives from compulsory 
days of communal works instituted by Campbell and the resentment they caused even after being reduced from 
78 days per annum to 52 and then 24. Work included road building, erecting prisons, hospitals and houses for 
officials, and changing the layout of and upgrading dwellings of I-Kiribati. By the 1930s, I-Kiribati 
governments were organising annual work programmes and setting the number of days of communal works 
accordingly. In the 1960s, the requirement was replaced with voluntary labour on “projects” that involved work 
of a customary nature, such as mwaneaba maintenance, and paid labour financed from increased local taxation. 
However, as the potential for the latter was not great, some minor communal services were re-instated by 
councils (Macdonald, 1972; Sabatier, 1977). Macdonald (1982) makes several references to this concept of “for 
the Government” and it is one that I too noticed from time to time in the form of a significant reluctance among 
I-Kiribati to perform not only manual labour but also committee work without payment, if it was attached to an 
“official” body. This contrasts completely with the willing and cheerful attitude that I-Kiribati have about work 
they do for utu, friends and visiting strangers. 
30 Noteworthy is that computerisation can be difficult to sustain, not only because of skill shortages but also 
because hardware suffers in the hot, sandy, saline, humid conditions and mains electricity is unreliable 
31 Banaba is still scattered with mining machinery, plant, asbestos-laden facilities and other industrial debris, 
which the BPC donated to the Government of Kiribati (King and Sigrah, 2004) 
32 The Nauru Island Agreement 1919 provided for Britain to receive 42% of ore produced for home 
consumption and that if this was not taken up for this to be shared between the other two partners for home 
consumption if they could use it, and for any remainder to be sold commercially elsewhere. Although only a 
very small quantity of phosphate actually went to Britain, it was not entitled to direct compensation for its share 
going to its partners.  
33 This designation persisted until 1967, when they were re-designated as island councils. 
34 Until 1917, these were designated as district magistrates. 
35 It was some time before district officers were re-appointed after WWII, and even then they included only one 
officer based on Tarawa for the whole of the Gilberts. In 1956, this was reduced even further by the two districts 
of the Gilberts and the Ellice being merged under one district commissioner supported by two touring 
subordinate district officers, all based on Tarawa (GEIC, 1957; Macdonald, 1972, 1982).  
36 Kawa came about between 1880 and 1910 as a result of pastors, Campbell and Goward breaking up kainga 
and obliging I-Kiribati to re-settle in standard dwelling areas in kawa laid out in an orderly line adjacent to a 
street, close to the church and mwaneaba (Macdonald, 1982). 
37 The use of a standard mark up and other pricing practices continued a tradition of uea and unimane being 
involved in price fixing, rather than left to individuals and to commodity and labour market forces. Historically, 
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Macdonald (1982) reports early responses to falling copra prices by uea and unimane were to put a tabu on 
trade, choosing to be oblivious to the same falling prices affecting companies exporting the copra. More 
recently, he tells of the price of surplus fish, etc. and handicrafts having been sold on and from Outer Islands at 
prices fixed collectively and for some time at amounts that may bear little relationship to supply and demand or 
to labour time and other inputs. 
38 In addition to these political and logistical encumbrances, Burns-Philp, Carpenter or other private trading 
companies inclined to return to the GEIC may have been dissuaded for economic-accounting reasons. 
39 The agreement was one on many throughout the colonial empire covering various commodities and was 
espoused by the purchaser as a method for furthering development of colonies. A related idea was the 
establishment in many colonies of marketing boards, including the GEIC Copra Board (now called the Kiribati 
Copra Cooperative Society). A separate Colony Handicrafts Cooperative Wholesale Society was established to 
handle curios, shark products, etc. (Maude, 1949; Morgan, 1980). 
40 Perhaps with racial undertones, Sabatier observed that 
The Gilbertese is only really interested in games, and maths for him is a pastime. Once he has grasped 
something he repeats it indefinitely and with a patience that has nothing to do with devoutness or 
genius. Any problem that requires thought finds him quite at a loss; the least pitfall and he is bowled 
over. The sporting excitement of doing calculations is to finish a problem quicker – or better – than his 
neighbour. And the result is obvious: it is either correct or not – like the spear that pierces a fish or goes 
to one side of it. (1977, p. 193). 
41 Little money is saved for extended periods by individuals for personal or business use. Bank accounts are 
used to look after small surpluses in good periods before being drawn on in poorer periods or for specific 
planned significant expenditures (Macdonald, 1982). 
42 Although fairly big by Kiribati standards, they are all small by external ones, having turnovers of perhaps 
one or two million dollars at most. They are involved in importing and wholesaling as well as retailing. They 
have difficulty in attracting overseas suppliers. It does not help that many potential suppliers are ignorant of 
Kiribati’s existence, let alone know how to ship goods there. In addition, like government enterprises, they can 
experience unusual cash flow problems because of the time it sometimes takes for goods to arrive at Betio and 
be distributed, let alone sold, being longer than normal credit periods their suppliers offer reliable customers. In 
addition, suppliers can be put off by methods of administration used by I-Kiribati that are at odds with their 
own. All in all, these make it difficult for Kiribati firms to obtain credit overseas (and from the Bank of 
Kiribati). The obvious repercussion is some discontinuity of supply of various items in the Kiribati retail sector. 
43 I was told by one I-Matang business proprietor that there was not much difference in tax and official 
paperwork between the two forms and that the main reason for him staying as a partnership was that he doubted 
very much if among most I-Kiribati the notion of a person having only limited liability for the debts of a 
business entity is properly understood, and so worthless. 
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Figure 1 Bloodlines comprising a Genealogy of Accounting appearing in Kiribati up to the 2000s 
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Figure 2 Structure of Government in the Gilberts by 1920 (Posts held by I-Matang in regular font, posts held by I-Kiribati in italics) 
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Figure 3 Structure of the Government of Kiribati c. 2000 (with accounting and finance areas elaborated more than others) 
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